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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Marta R. Colburn for the Master 
of Science in Political Science presented February 8, 1995, 
and accepted by the thesis committee and the department. 
Title: Liberalism, Community, and the Context of Choice 
Issues of community have become an important focus in 
the field of political theory in North America. Critics of 
liberalism, the dominant American theoretical tradition, 
have charged that liberal theorists have misconceived the 
nature of community at the ontological and societal level. 
Some critics see a relationship between the failure of 
liberal theorists to adequately address community and 
certain social pathologies facing the American liberal 
polity. 
This thesis seeks to address the following questions: 
How have liberal theorists typically dealt with the issue of 
community? What are the major criticisms related to issues 
of community currently being leveled at liberalism? Are 
there theorists who have noted liberalism's weaknesses with 
regard to community and who have retooled the liberal 
enterprise? Finally, assuming a liberal response, which of 
these if any are the most compelling? 
In response to the last question, the work of two 
liberal theorists, Will Kymlicka and William Galston, are 
analyzed for their responses to criticisms of liberalism 
issuing from the communitarian school. In the findings of 
this thesis, the liberal response found in Kymlicka's 
Liberalism, Community, and Culture presents the most 
powerful reply to these critiques. Kymlicka uses the 
challenge of minority rights to liberal conceptions of 
justice to argue that liberal traditions can be drawn upon 
for a coherent recognition of culture as an essential right 
of the individual. Kymlicka bases his argument for 
expanding liberal understandings of minority rights on 
liberalism's commitment to equality of circumstances; 
viewing culture as a potential source of inequality which 
the dominant culture takes for granted, but which minority 
cultures must struggle to maintain. 
By addressing the questions above I hope to contribute 
to the debate about liberalism and community and sharpen the 
insights of liberal political theory. By incorporating the 
insights of Kymlicka into liberal theory I believe that 
liberalism can better address public policy challenges in 
contemporary American society, many of which are closely 
tied to concerns of community. 
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... man is only what he is made to be by his 
external circumstances; he is necessarily elevated 
by his equals; he contracts from them his habits 
and his wants; his ideas are no longer his own; he 
enjoys, from the enviable prerogative of his 
species, a capacity of developing his 
understanding by the power of imitation, and the 
influence of society. 1 
Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard 
The Wild Boy of Aveyron 
The concept of community is one which has generated 
1 
considerable discussion and debate over the millennium. The 
ideas articulated about integral aspects of community such 
as laws and mores have ranged from the secular to the divine 
and many shades in between. This debate continues today not 
only among contemporary political theorists but also in less 
academic circles; the "meaning" of community, the "crisis" 
in community, the "break down" of community, have been 
raised in the public arena of media and politics by diverse 
voices. In contemporary political and legal spheres, 
1 Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard, "The Wild Boy of 
Aveyron", in Wolf Children and the Problem of 
Human Nature, by Lucien Malson, (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1972), p. 91. Jean Itard was a 
physician, and teacher, at the National Institute 
for the Deaf and Dumb in Paris who chronicled his 
treatment of Victor, the "Wolf-Boy of Aveyron", 
from his capture in 1799. The quotation is taken 
form the 1802 English translation of his first 
report on Victor in 1801. 
theorists from a variety of perspectives have addressed 
issues relating to community. To many it seems a critical 
issue generating heated debate amongst the protagonists. 
2 
On the issue of community, liberalism, as the dominant 
political theory in American society, is coming under attack 
from many quarters. There are those that criticize 
liberalism for its deleterious impact on community stemming 
from it secular nature, and there are those who criticize it 
for destroying community with its self-serving capitalist 
Protestant ethic. It can be stated that the leading 
political theory in a society will come under attack in 
times of crisis, simply due to its dominant position and the 
propensity to seek simple answers to complex problems. This 
caveat aside, liberalism may have a particular Achilles heel 
when it comes to issues of community. 
Widely held concerns for collective aspects of society 
are challenging the foundations of the atomistic nature of 
life in contemporary America. Liberal theorists, whatever 
their role in contributing to this situation, are responding 
to the challenge. Traditionally, liberal theorists have not 
struggled with the topic of community. They have focused 
more of their attention on the individual and their 
relationship with the state. However, the recent onslaught 
against liberalism in political theory regarding its effect 
on communal association has led a number of liberal 
theorists down some promising avenues. 
3 
This thesis will attempt to sift through the liberal 
vocabulary and a number of leading liberal theorists with 
regard to issues of community. Further it will examine 
criticisms of liberal theory and theorists based in the 
American polity and summarize the work of two leading 
liberal theorists whose work is of direct relevance to 
issues of community. The questions addressed in this thesis 
are related to the challenge of community to liberalism and 
how this challenge has expanded the liberal project. I 
shall examine the treatment of community and the context of 
choice in the writings of a number of contemporary 
philosophers from the liberal camp and those critical of 
liberalism. The specific questions focused on through the 
course of this study are: How have liberal theorists 
typically dealt with the issue of community? What are the 
salient criticisms related to issues of community currently 
being leveled at liberalism? Are there theorists who have 
noted liberalism's weaknesses with regard to community and 
who have retooled the liberal enterprise? Finally, which of 
these liberal responses are the most compelling?. 
THE VOCABULARY 
Liberalism 
When one examines the history of liberalism one 
4 
witnesses a considerable diversity of issues that it has 
addressed as it has responded to challenges faced by liberal 
and non-liberal communities. Liberalism is not easily and 
succinctly defined. This thesis will limit itself to 
discussing liberal theory, not with meanings and 
misunderstanding associated with the term liberal used as an 
adjective. Richard Flathman, a contemporary leading liberal 
theorist, summarizes some of the problems in defining 
liberalism. 
It is identified by a series of political causes 
espoused by liberals over the centuries, by a 
variety of claims about the working of society and 
the economy, and by a cluster of ideas concerning 
the fundamental principles of political morality. 
It is probably true to say that no political 
cause, no one vision of society nor any political 
principle has commanded the respect of liberals in 
any given generation, let alone through the 
centuries. 2 
Disciples as well as critics of liberalism recognize 
that liberalism is not a closely integrated doctrine. 
Richard Flathman observes that liberalism's "proponents have 
held to a considerable and frequently changing variety of 
views and its historians and critics have regularly 
disagreed concerning its main ideas and tendencies. 113 
Flathman explains that the breadth of doctrine found under 
2 As quoted by Joseph Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom, (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1986), 
p. 1. 
3 Richard E. Flathman, Towards a Liberalism, 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1989)' p. 2. 
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liberalism's shadow is partially the result of liberal 
"suspicion of systematic, programmatic, certainly dogmatic 
theorizing. "4 
I shall rely on Bruce Ackerman's definition of the 
tenets of liberalism, as related by Flathman in his book 
Towards a Liberalism, to introduce liberal terminology, and 
its basic view of society as regarding the individual's role 
in communal interactions. 
(1) Human beings are purposive, goal-seeking 
creatures whose actions and patterns of action 
cannot be understood apart from their conceptions 
of the good. (2) Conceptions of the good and goals 
of action are irreducibly plural. There are no 
criteria of good that exclude the possibility of 
cogent disputation, and application of the 
available criteria frequently leads to conflicting 
judgements and conclusions. (3) There is a 
scarcity of at least some of the goods that human 
beings seek and of the resources necessary to 
effective pursuit of those goods. (4) Hence there 
is certain to be disagreement and competition and 
very likely to be conflict among human beings. (5) 
Disagreement, competition, and conflict neither 
can nor should be eliminated, but conflict must be 
contained within nondestructive limits. (6) The 
primary objective of politics is to promote an 
ordering of human interaction which allows each 
person the greatest possible freedom to pursue 
goals compatible with effective constraints on 
destructive conflict. 5 
Since liberalism has worn many faces over the centuries, 
this particular definition of the foundations of liberal 
philosophy is by no means exhaustive of liberalism or 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid, p. 49-50. 
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exclusive to it6 • 
Community and the Context of Choice 
This discourse on liberalism, community and the context 
of choice will not propose a version of the ideal or "real" 
community. I shall define community as the sharing of 
interactions, or affiliations, or conceptions of the good 
not wholly on a voluntary and rational basis. This minimal 
definition aims to avoid a number of methodological and 
ontological pitfalls commonly encountered when one is 
cornbatting the atomistic tendencies of liberalism. 
In elaboration of this basic idea, community contains 
the essential characteristic as the context within which 
normative life-decisions are made. A community may consist 
of an indigenous minority culture navigating within a 
dominant and possibly hostile culture, or it may be the 
influences and networks which shape the decisions of a 
white, middle-class truck driver. However, community is 
more than just the circle one chooses to associate with. It 
also includes factors one may have little influence upon, 
such as aspects of popular culture (e.g. television) and 
political realities (e.g. the legal system). I recognize 
the myriad of communities which could provide an environment 
conducive to the flourishing of a liberal polity and 
sustaining to a liberal theory of justice. 
6 Ibid, p. 50. 
In the following passage Will Kymlicka, one of the 
liberal theorists I shall focus on in this thesis, 
articulates an understanding of community as the context of 
choice using the vocabulary of liberalism: 
So we have two preconditions for the fulfillment 
of our essential interests in leading a life that 
is good. One is that we lead our life from the 
inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what 
gives value to life; the other is that we be free 
to question those beliefs, to examine them in 
light of whatever information and examples and 
arguments our culture can provide. Individuals 
must therefore have the resources and liberties 
needed to live their lives in accordance with 
their beliefs about value, without being 
imprisoned or penalized for unorthodox religious 
or sexual practices etc. Hence the traditional 
liberal concern for civil and personal liberties. 
And individuals must have the cultural conditions 
conducive to acquiring an awareness of different 
views about the good life, and to acquiring an 
ability to intelligently examine and re-examine 
these views. Hence the equally traditional 
liberal concern for education, freedom of 
expression, freedom of the press, artistic 
freedom, etc. These liberties enable us to judge 
what is valuable in life in the only way we can 
judge such things--i.e. by exploring different 
aspects of our collective cultural heritage. 7 
The idea of cultural community is important to this 
definition of the context of choice. Kymlicka makes a 
distinction between political and cultural communities 
7 
useful to this thesis. They are respectively the structures 
of a modern state, with a government and shared legal 





Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and 
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 
Ibid, p. 135. 
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context of choice for life-plans allowing us to judge for 
ourselves the value of our choices. 9 While this 
distinction is essential, there are many points where 
cultural and political communities are deeply intertwined 
and difficult to separate for purposes of analysis. 
Features of mass culture in American society promote certain 
values which are often inseparable from political life. In 
modernity, government intervention and regulation, or lack 
thereof, deeply affects how we live our lives and the 
choices we make about the good. 
Kymlicka aptly describes the role of culture in the 
choice process in the following: 
Different ways of life are not simply different 
patterns of physical movements. The physical 
movements only have meaning to us because they are 
identified as having significance by our culture, 
because they fit into some pattern of activities 
which is culturally recognized as a way of leading 
one's life. We learn about these patterns of 
activity through their presence in stories we've 
heard about the lives, real or imaginary, of 
others. They become potential models, and define 
potential roles, that we can adopt as our own. 
From childhood on, we become aware both that we 
are already participants in certain forms of life 
(familial, religious, sexual, educational, etc.), 
and that there are other ways of life which of fer 
alternative models and roles that we may, in time, 
come to endorse. We decide how to lead our lives 
by situating ourselves in these cultural 
narratives, by adopting roles that have struck us 
as worthwhile ones, as ones worth living (which 
may, of course, include the roles we were brought 
9 Particular cultural communities are not 
frozen in time, but continue "to exist even when 
its members are free to modify the character of 
the culture, should they find its traditional ways 
of life no longer worth while." (Ibid, p. 166-7.) 
9 
up to occupy) . 10 
The development of a number of capacities are 
undeniably tied to the community. For example the capacity 
for moral judgment is tied in numerous ways to the moral 
life of a community. Charles Larmore identifies the moral 
scheme of the community as being the foremost determinant in 
the development of moral judgment11 • "[N]o one can acquire 
judgment by being imparted some kind of formal doctrine. It 
can be learned only through practice, through being trained 
in the performance of right actions .... Because training and 
experience play such a vital role in the acquisition of 
judgment, the development of moral character depends upon 
the moral life of the community. 1112 However, this point 
does not assert that the community is the only factor worthy 
of consideration. 
This understanding of community aims to avoid viewing 
community as the only factor entering the choice process. 
This would be an error similar to those who maintain that 
the choice process is self-contained in the individual--
biologically, genetically, morally, or intellectually 
10 Ibid, p. 165. 
11 Larmore defines moral judgment as aiming 
"at the appropriate application of moral rules to 
particular circumstances insofar as their 
application requires choosing among morally 
different alternatives." Charles E. Larmore, 
Patterns of Moral Complexity (Columbia University, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 7. 
12 Ibid, p. 15. 
10 
generated. It merely attempts to bring community back into 
the dialogue of understanding the choice process, where it 
is often excluded. 
The Choices 
The choices of concern in this thesis are choices which 
have normative significance. The range of choices with 
normative significance will vary within one culture, and 
between cultures and generations: one culture may confer 
moral consequences on the eating of beef, while another 
culture may view it as morally neutral. Every culture has a 
range of understandings about what is meaningful, what is 
harmful, how to live the "good" life; in other words 
different cultures may generate various "conceptions of the· 
good". A distinguishing characteristic of liberalism is its 
commitment to allow a diversity of conceptions of the good 
to flourish. 
Richard Flathman explains the notion "conceptions of 
the good" as the voluntary forming and pursuing of desires 
and interests, ends and purposes. 13 A conception of the 
good may draw on one or more moral systems to provide a 
framework for individual choice. A moral system is a 
pattern of beliefs and interactions which give meaning to 
individual action through reference to a larger narrative of 
human life; individual moral choice makes sense only by 
13 Flathman, 1989, p. 8. 
relating it to broader understandings of the good. 
Charles Taylor in his book Sources of the Self: The 
Making of the Modern Identity writes that moral meaning is 
given to individual action by people relating "their story 
to a greater pattern of history, as the realization of a 
good, whether it be the traditional Heilsgeschicte of 
Christianity, or that of the progress of mankind, or the 
coming Revolution, or the building of a peaceful world, or 
11 
the retrieval or continuance of our national culture .... The 
secret of their strength is their capacity to confer meaning 
and substance on people's lives. 1114 One could say that 
morality provides a framework for understanding the larger 
picture of humanity and guidelines for living in harmony 
within that structure. 
Alasdair Macintyre in his influential book After 
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory poetically describes the 
narrative of a human life. 
Man is in his actions and practice, as well as in 
his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. 
He is not essentially, but becomes through his 
history, a teller of stories that aspire to 
truth ... It is through hearing stories about wicked 
stepmother, lost children, good but misguided 
kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, youngest sons 
who receive no inheritance but must make their own 
way in the world and the eldest sons who waste 
their inheritance on riotous living and go into 
exile to live with swine, that children learn or 
mislearn both what a child and what a parent is, 
14 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The 
Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 
97. 
12 
what the cast of characters may be in the drama 
into which they have been born and what the ways 
of the world are. Deprive children of stories and 
you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in 
their actions as in their words. 15 
Taylor elaborates on Macintyre's words with the 
observation that moral sources also empower and that the 
business of articulating the good exposes our narratives. 
"To come closer to them, to have a clearer view of them, to 
come to grasp what they involve, is for those who recognize 
them to be moved to love or respect them, and through this 
love/respect to be better enabled to live up to them. And 
articulation can bring them closer. "16 
The choices the inhabitants of a particular culture 
make which have moral significance within the framework of 
that culture are the choices which relate to this thesis and 
the context of the community. 
THE PLAN FORWARD 
This thesis struggles with issues of community in the 
realm of political theory because of a concern for the 
challenges facing American society. I am not alone in this 
15 Alasdair, Macintyre, After Virtue: A 
Study in Moral Theory, (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 216. 
16 Taylor, 1989, p. 96. 
13 
concern. Theorists from a variety of perspectives have 
identified critical issues in the American polity which loom 
on the horizon. This crisis is aptly summarized by William 
Galston who states that his underlying motivation for his 
book Liberal Purposes was "evoked not so much by theoretical 
puzzles as by civic experiences: of rising rates of crime, 
drug abuse, and family breakdown; of the near collapse of 
effective public education; of greed and shortsightedness 
run amok in public and private affairs; of a steady decline 
in public awareness and an equally steady rise in political 
cynicism; and of what I can only regard as the relentless 
tribalization and barbarization of American life. "17 
I do not believe that the crises Galston lists can be 
blamed on the theorist. Nevertheless, in order to solve the 
plethora of the problems in the contemporary world 
tremendous efforts are required, that include the talents of 
theorists. This thesis has taken liberalism as a starting 
point due to its central position within contemporary 
political theory and my own attraction to its powerful 
arguments and concern with justice. 
I believe that research into issues of community will 
prove a fruitful study because there are at least three 
relevant problems identified nagging at the heels of 
17 William Galston, Liberal Purposes: 
Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal 
State, (Cambridge Mass: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 6. 
contemporary theory. First, fragmentation and atomism in 
American life have been accurately identified as 
problematic, and many associate liberalism with these 
phenomena18 • · Second, liberalism as the dominant political 
ideology in American society needs to confront critical 
issues of community within the realm of theory. Third, 
14 
liberalism in its traditional articulations is particularly 
vulnerable to criticisms with regard to issues of community. 
By addressing the questions outlined in this introduction I 
hope to contribute to the debate about liberalism, community 
and the context of choice and sharpen the insights of 
liberal political theory. 
The second chapter of this work will examine the 
presuppositions of liberalism, from the foundationalist and 
deontological cast, focusing on John Rawls' Theory of 
Justice and drawing on other liberal theorists for 
substantiation. Chapter three will draw on the work of 
critics of liberalism particularly from the communitarian 
camp responding to a number of liberal ontological and 
social presuppositions: Alasdair Macintyre, Charles Taylor, 
Benjamin Barber, and others. The fourth chapter examines 
18 Taylor notes that atomism, which is 
evident in the social contract theories of 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke and others. For the 
first time these theories contain the concept of a 
contract of association. "But what cannot now be 
taken for granted anymore is a community with 
decisional power over its members. People start 
off as political atoms." Taylor, 1989, p. 193. 
15 
the recent work of Will Kymlicka and William Galston19 , 
both of whom respond to criticisms of liberalism, 
particularly from the communitarian attack, by using 
examples drawn from real life policy considerations in the 
liberal polity. The final chapter will compare the work of 
Kymlicka and Galston and assess how effective the liberal 
response has been in def ending liberal theory from the 
communitarian onslaught. 
19 Liberalism, Community, and Culture and 
Liberal Purposes respectively. 
CHAPTER II 
LIBERALS AND THE CONTEXT OF CHOICE 
The likings and dislikings of society, or of some 
powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing 
which has practically determined the rules laid 
down for general observance, under the penalties 
of law or opinion. 
John Stuart Mill 
On Liberty2° 
Within the historical legacy of liberalism I shall 
focus my discussion on that portion of the contemporary 
interpretive debate in North America which pertains to the 
16 
relationship between the individual and the community. The· 
more common approach to liberalism is to examine the 
relationship between the individual and the state21 , yet 
there is much in the broad vocabulary of liberalism which is 
relevant to a discussion of community and the context of 
20 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. 
Alburey Castell (Arlington Heights, Illinois: 
Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1947), p. 7. 
21 Thomas A. Spragens discusses four 
liberal versions of the relationship between the 
liberal state and society and culture and the 
individual, i.e. public and private realms: the 
neutralist, contractualist, traditionalist, and 
radical conceptions. Thomas A. Spragens, 
"Reconstructing Liberal Theory: Reason and Liberal 
Culture," in Liberals on Liberalism, Alfonso J. 
Damico, ed., (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1986) p. 38. 
choice. 
This chapter will focus on the presuppositions of 
liberalism, many of which are shared by the community of 
contemporary theorists. This chapter will establish the 
liberal vocabulary which will provide an anchor for 
criticisms and a foundation upon which to build. John 
Rawls' A Theory of Justice will be an essential reference 
point in this discussion of liberalism due to its dominant 
position in contemporary political thought. 
17 
The liberal terms I will focus on are those of an 
ontological nature and a number of disparate features of the 
liberal state and society as they relate to community and 
the context of choice. Ackerman's initial definition 
introduced many of the presuppositions about to be 
discussed. 
ONTOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There are a number of human capacities presupposed by 
liberal philosophy which relate to this thesis. Ontological 
claims about the individual are entwined with the nature of 
society and the individual's relationship to it. Although 
18 
many liberals are committed to a deontological 22 philosophy 
they also share the presupposition of much of the Western 
philosophical tradition which attributes the closely related 
capacities of free will and rationality to humans. 
Agency and Rationality 
It is clear that a human ontology which includes a 
conception of free will and moral agency pre-dates modern 
times. An ancient account of free will is found in the 
biblical culpability of Adam and Eve23 • In the Judeo-
Christian heritage free will is one of the qualifying 
features of human beings and rationality is the basis of 
choice and moral responsibility. The concept of free will 
is predicated on human rationality. Moreover, Western 
theological discussions of free will are incomplete without 
reference to a creator. 
The "flip side" of free will is of course moral 
22 As defined by Rawls: "a deontological 
theory, one that either does not specify the good 
independently from the right, or does not 
interpret the right as maximizing the good. (It 
should be noted that deontological theories are 
defined as non-teleological ones, not as views 
that characterize the rightness of institutions 
and acts independently from their consequences.)" 
Rawls, 1971, p. 30. 
23 "In the Hebrew-Christian moral traditions, 
a moral agent is held answerable not only for what 
he voluntarily does but also for what he intends." 
Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 122. 
19 
responsibility, and categories of moral culpability are tied 
to communal interpretations of rational potentials and 
limitations. Individuals have often been judged and 
punished under common morality and legal systems according 
to an individual's culturally defined rational ability: sub-
rational (blacks, in a slave economy), pre-rational {minors 
or idiots) , or irrational (women) 24 • 
Certainly, there are alternative understandings of 
human choice and culpability which emphasize circumstances, 
fate, or destiny, and diminish the role of human agency. 
However, in the Western monotheistic tradition the emphasis 
has been on free will and individual responsibility for our 
actions, thoughts, and choices. Alan Donagan in his book 
The Theory of Morality notes that the connection between 
rationality and voluntary action is integral to the 
Christian-Hebrew tradition, as articulated by Aquinas. 
"Whatever a human being does as an agent, he does as a 
rational creature .... and that every operatio rationalis is a 
voluntarium, or voluntary act. "25 
Western secular philosophical traditions have also 
based free will claims on human rationality. In the Post-
24 For example, denial of property control 
and exclusion from in western legal systems, for 
purposes of giving witness and serving jury duty, 
were often justified on the basis of women's 
irrationality, emotional nature, and propensity to 
hysteria. 
25 Ibid, p. 114. 
20 
Enlightenment period the human ability to make rational 
choices in pursuit of the human understanding of the good 
gained new philosophical justifications. With 
industrialization new visions of the good life proliferated. 
Political and social philosophy in the West struggled to 
comprehend this situation with theories that encouraged 
tolerance and reenforced belief in human potential for 
autonomy and good. 
In contemporary liberal theory one can see this 
tradition continuing today. John Rawls has carved a 
leadership position in liberal theory for his Kantian 
inspired discussion of justice, particularly with his 
seminal A Theory of Justice. Through the heuristic 
mechanism of a hypothetical social contract26 , Rawls uses 
the devices of "an original position" 27 and "veil of 
ignorance" 28 to arrive at his two principles of justice as 
26 "My aim is to present a conception of 
justice which generalizes and carries to a higher 
level of abstraction the familiar theory of the 
social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, 
and Kant." Rawls, 1971, p. 11. 
27 "In justice as fairness the original 
position of equality corresponds to the state of 
nature in the traditional theory of the social 
contract. This original position is not, of 
course, thought of as an actual historical state 
of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of 
culture. It is understood as a purely 
hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead 
to a certain conception of justice." Ibid, p. 12. 
28 "Among the essential features of this 
situation is that no one knows his place in 
society, his class position or social status, nor 
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fairness: "1) Each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 2) 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle29 , 
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 1130 These two 
principles of justice are concerned with the just and fair 
distribution of all primary social goods, which consist of 
"liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases 
of self-respect" 31 and "are to be distributed equally 
unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods 
is to the advantage of the least favored. "32 
does any one know his fortune in the distribution 
of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, 
strength, and the like. I shall even assume that 
the parties do not know their conceptions of the 
good or their special psychological propensities. 
The principles of justice are chosen from behind a 
veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is 
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of 
principles by the outcome of natural chance or the 
contingency of social circumstances." Ibid. 
29 "The just saving principle can be 
regarded as an understanding between generations 
to carry their fair share of the burden of 
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The Western free will tradition is evidenced in Rawls' 
concept of autonomy which is based upon his understanding of 
the Kantian model as: 
That a person is acting autonomously when the 
principles of his action are chosen by him as the 
most adequate possible expression of his nature as 
a free and equal rational being. The principles 
he acts upon are not adopted because of his social 
position or natural endowments, or in view of the 
particular kind of society in which he lives or 
the specific things that he happens to want. To 
act on such principles is to act 
heteronomously. 33 
Rawls uses the veil of ignorance in an attempt to create a 
situation under which the principles of justice are to be 
chosen by autonomous individuals. "The parties arrive at 
their choice together as free and equal rational persons 
knowing only that those circumstances obtain which give rise 
to the need for principles of justice. "34 Additionally, 
the circumstance of the original position Rawls believes 
allow him to claim his theory as objective: "its 
stipulations express the restrictions on arguments that 
force us to consider the choice of principles unencumbered 
by the singularities of the circumstances in which we find 
ourselves" . 35 
Rawls's Kantian affiliation is particularly evident in 
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rationality. Rawls defines a person as "a human life lived 
according to a plan. "36 Furthermore, "a rational person is 
thought to have a coherent set of preferences between the 
options open to him. He ranks these options according to 
how well they further his purposes; he follows the plan 
which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and 
which has the greater chance of being successfully 
executed. "37 
Rawls lists the ontological assumptions of the 
creatures in the original position as: 1) mutually 
disinterested rationality: "the persons in the original 
position try to acknowledge principles which advance their 
system of ends as far as possible ... They do not wish a 
high or a low score for their opponents, nor do they seek to 
maximize or minimize the difference between their successes 
and those of others. "38 They do not possess a sense of 
competition. 2) "The parties are presumed to be capable of a 
sense of justice and this fact is public knowledge among 
them. "39 
Below are Rawls' counting principles which demonstrate 
the role of rational choice in justice as fairness and which 
detail the rational choice process for short-term plans. 
36 Ibid, p. 408. 
37 Ibid, p. 143. 
38 Ibid, p. 144. 
39 Ibid, p. 145 
- First, the principle of effective means. "Given the 
objective, one is to achieve it with the least 
expenditure of means (whatever they are); or given 
the means, one is to fulfill the objective to the 
fullest possible extent. 1140 
Second, the principle is "that one (short-term) plan is 
to be preferred to another if its execution would 
achieve all of the desired aims of the other plan 
and one or more further aims in addition. "41 
- Third, the principle of greater likelihood holds "that 
some objectives have a greater chance of being 
realized by one plan than the other, yet at the 
same time none of the remaining aims are less 
likely to be attained. 1142 
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Rawls admits the slant of his theory's account of 
rational choice and deliberative rationality by stating that 
it is premised on an assumption "that there are no errors of 
calculation or reasoning, and that the facts are correctly 
assessed." Rawls goes on to elaborate that "[h]is choice 
may be an unhappy one, but if so it is because his beliefs 
are understandably mistaken or his knowledge insufficient, 








was confused as to what he really wanted. "43 In discussing 
the choice process Rawls notes that "the rationality of a 
person's choice does not depend upon how much he knows, but 
only upon how well he reasons from whatever information he 
has, however incomplete. "44 The rationality of the 
available alternatives is evident when "there is no other 
plan which, taking everything into account, would be 
preferable. "45 
The Good 
The outline Rawls sketches for us of the minimalist 
creatures in the original position is not complete without 
exploring further his thin theory of the good. Although he 
labels his theory deontological, the right being prior to 
the good, he recognizes that justice as fairness is 
incomplete without a theory of the good. "It is necessary 
to rely on some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions 
about the parties' motives in the original position. "46 
The purpose of the skeleton of good which Rawls presents is 
"to secure the premises about primary goods required to 
arrive at the principles of justice" 47 and "to explicate 
43 Ibid, p. 417. 
44 Ibid, p. 397. 
45 Ibid, p. 93. 
46 Ibid, p. 396. 
47 Ibid. 
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the notion of rationality underlying the choice of 
principles in the original position." 48 
Rawls notes that a theory of the good facilitates 
identifying the least favored members of society in the 
difference principle. In order for him to do so he requires 
some criteria allowing him to identify those least and most 
favored. Additionally, his list of primary goods (with 
self-respect heading the list) which rational individuals 
desire for executing their plans of life, specifies 
characteristics of the good. Finally, "within the thin 
theory it turns out that having a sense of justice is indeed 
a good, then a well-ordered society is as stable as one can 
hope for. 1149 
With the thin theory of the good clarified, Rawls 
admits that a full theory of the good is necessary once the 
principles of justice are secured. However, I will now 
elaborate further on Rawls' theory of persons. He 
understands conceptions of the good, or life plans, as 
rational if they lead to happiness. For Rawls the rational 
plan is the one which determines the individual's good, and 
hence makes that individual happy50 • "The good is the 
48 
49 
Ibid, p. 397. 
Ibid, p. 398-9. 
50 This understanding of the good based on 
the list of primary goods Rawls includes in his 
justice as fairness draws on a theory of good he 
dates to Aristotle, which is accepted by a wide 
range of philosophers, from Kant's contract 
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satisfaction of rational desire. "51 Rawls defines 
happiness when an individual "is in the way of a successful 
execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life drawn up 
under (more or less) favorable conditions, and he is 
reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through. 
Someone is happy when his plans are going well, his more 
important aspirations being fulfilled, and he feels sure 
that his good fortune will endure. 1152 
Richard Flathman is another leading liberal whose 
insight into the good is embodied in his Liberal Principle 
(LP). Flathman's LP states that "It is a prima facie good 
for persons to form, to act on, and to satisfy and achieve 
desires and interests, objectives and purposes. 1153 His LP 
"relies on claims about the usual characteristics of human 
beings and their circumstances, but it is also contextualist 
or culture-specific rather than transcendental or 
universalistic. 1154 
Flathman's LP and his individualist liberalism are 
tempered by his recognition that "the interests and desires 
that individuals form are an important part the result of 
doctrine to Sidgwick's utilitarian liberalism. 
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the location of those individuals in one of the many 
differing cultural traditions and societies and, more 
proximately, their associations and interactions with groups 
of individuals in their own cultures and societies." 55 His 
recognition of the importance of the context provides an 
important linkage to the next section on the liberal state 
and society. 
LIBERAL STATE AND SOCIETY 
The relationship between the individual and the state 
in liberal theory plays a central role. One of the earliest 
liberal philosophers, John S. Mill, articulates the 
authority of society over the individual and identifies the 
emergence of this tradition as arising due to the 
disintegration of the moral yoke of the Universal Church. 56 
[m]inorities, seeing that they had no chance of 
becoming majorities, were under the necessity of 
pleading to those whom they could not convert, for 
permission to differ. It is accordingly on this 
battle-field, almost solely, that the rights of 
the individual against society have been asserted 
on broad grounds of principle, and the claims of 
society to exercise authority over dissentients, 
openly controverted. 57 
55 Ibid, p. 8. 
56 Mill, On Liberty, p. 7. 
57 Ibid, p.7-8. 
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In liberal theory the backdrop of the relationship 
between the individual and his/her community is a conception 
of society where certain conditions obtain. In Ackerman's 
tenets of liberalism, a number of presuppositions about 
liberal society emerge: relative scarcity of some resources, 
certainty of conflict and competition, and the need to 
contain such conflict. Also included in the preconditions 
of the liberal polity is a modern state, with a commitment 
to neutrality towards conceptions of the good, members of a 
political community with a plurality of conceptions of the 
good, and shared understanding of the need and desirability 
to remain a community (which implies a shared language of 
discourse) . Ronald Dworkin would further add to this list 
the mechanisms necessary to satisfy the principles of 
liberalism "the two main institutions of our own political 
economy: the economic market, for decisions about what goods 
shall be produced and how they shall be distributed, and 
representative democracy, for collective decisions about 
what conduct shall be prohibited or regulated. " 58 
Pluralism and Neutrality 
Ackerman's second and sixth tenets address the issues 
of plurality and state neutrality. Charles Larmore in 
58 Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism, 11 
Liberalism and Its Critics, ed. Michael Sandel 
(New York: New York University Press, 1984), p. 
66. 
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Patterns of Moral Complexity elaborates on necessary 
conditions for the liberal society to flourish: "pluralism, 
or the idea that there are many viable conceptions of the 
good life that neither represent different versions of some 
single, homogeneous good nor fall into any discernible 
hierarchy; and toleration, or the idea that because 
reasonable persons disagree about the value of various 
conceptions of the good life, we must learn to live with 
those who do not share our ideals. Neither pluralism nor 
toleration makes any sense in the light of a monistic view 
of the good life about which reasonable people will 
supposedly agree. 1159 
It is a liberal assumption (with which many non-
liberals would agree) that a climate of choice characterized 
by anarchy or totalitarian politics is destructive to human 
potentials. In Larmore's discussion of political liberalism 
he identifies neutrality of the state as the distinguishing 
feature of liberalism. Larmore recognizes that some 
historical versions of liberalism have not relegated 
neutrality this central role (for example utilitarian 
liberalism60 ) • He notes that many liberals have justified 
59 Larmore, 1987, p. 23. 
60 Larmore maintains that classical 
utilitarian liberalism fails to be neutral 
"because it subscribes to a subjectivist 
conception of the good and thus of the good life" 
which is based upon a "neutral" standard of 
pleasure or satisfaction. Ibid, p. 49. 
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their belief in neutrality on the grounds of their 
understanding of human needs/interests, such as skepticism, 
experimentation, or individual autonomy. Larmore believes 
that these are not neutral grounds for justification of 
political neutrality, but rather that they are a universal 
form of rational dialogue. 
Ronald Dworkin would agree with Larmore's assertion 
that the concept of neutrality is central to liberalism. He 
holds that it is a person's view of equality which 
determines whether they are liberal or not. Specifically, a 
liberal ascribes to a view of equality that supposes the 
government to be neutral on the question of the good 
life. 61 This understanding of equality means that 
"resources and opportunities should be distributed, so far 
as possible, equally, so that roughly the same share of 
whatever is available is devoted to satisfying the ambitions 
of each. 1162 
Conflict and Stability 
The conception of the individual in a state of natural 
conflict, or antagonism, with others in society for limited 
resources is found in many articulations of liberalism, 
including Ackerman's fourth, fifth and sixth tenets. It is 
presumed that all societies will develop a plurality of 
61 
62 
Dworkin, 1984, p. 64. 
Ibid, p. 65. 
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conceptions of the good by the very nature of human agency. 
With, or without, a liberal climate which allows pluralism 
to flourish, free will and agency will generate differences. 
Flathman describes free agency in the communal context. 
"Freedom" and "unfreedom" are predicates of human 
actions. Roughly, actions are taken by (and hence 
talk of both freedom and unfreedom presupposes) 
persons who are "agents," that is, persons who, in 
the setting of a community with a shared language 
and the elements that Wittgenstein and others have 
identified as necessary to such a language, form 
and hold beliefs; form desires and interests, 
objectives and purposes, that are influenced by 
their beliefs; frame intentions to act to satisfy 
their desires, interests, and so forth; and 
attempt to act on their intentions. 63 
Flathman's LP "namely, that it is a prima facie a good thing 
for individuals to form, to act on, and more or less 
regularly to satisfy (their) interests and desires, their 
ends and purposes" 64 undergirds conceptions of the liberal 
state. However, this freedom of individual agency protected 
in LP is not without limits. The function of the state is 
to referee the inevitable conflicting claims and freedoms. 
"Because freedom and its values will be on both or all sides 
of such conflicts, the conflicts cannot be resolved without 
appeal to considerations other than freedom itself ." 65 
In addition to the state, the mechanisms of 
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actions of members. Flathman notes that "If as a 
generalization liberals have tended to be more suspicious of 
or cautious about these characteristics of modern Western 
societies, if they have tended to be selective concerning 
means of limiting diversity, they have denied neither the 
social and political importance of limitations nor the 
possibility of interpersonally convincing justifications for 
the particular limitations adopted and imposed. "66 This is 
one traditional reason for the liberal emphasis on state 
supported education which serves as an important factor in 
socializing civic (i.e. liberal) values. 
Emily Gill notes the importance of the context of 
conflict in the individual's range of choices to resolve the 
antagonisms that occur in a community. 
Now if practices, the content of individual lives, 
institutions, and traditions, all provide the 
substance or occasions for conflict, individuals, 
I believe, play two roles within these 
continuities of conflict. First, they may choose 
among various alternatives in attempts to resolve 
conflicts, always choosing from within the context 
of the imperatives of their particular 
tradition(s). Second, their choices and 
resolutions have an impact on them so that they 
define themselves differently, whether singly or 
in/as a group, as a result of their prior choices 
and the experiences these choices represent, than 
would be the case if they had not grappled with 
the issues involved in these earlier conflicts. 67 
66 Ibid, p. 9. 
67 Emily R. Gill, "Goods, Virtues, and the 
Constitution of the Self" in Alfonso J. Damico, 
ed. Liberals on Liberalism (Totowa, New Jersey: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1986) p. 122. 
Accompanying the presupposition of conflict is the 
liberal belief that conflict should be controlled and that 
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stability should be sought. An important role of the state 
is to regulate and channel conflict. 
It is reasonable to assume that even in a well-
ordered society the coercive powers of government 
are to some degree necessary for the stability of 
social cooperation .... The role of an authorized 
public interpretation of rules supported by 
collective sanctions is precisely to overcome this 
instability. By enforcing a public system of 
penalties government removes the grounds for 
thinking that others are not complying with the 
rules. For this reason alone, a coercive 
sovereign is presumably always necessary, even 
though in a well-ordered society sanctions are not 
severe and may never need to be imposed. 68 
This articulation by John Rawls of the need for stability he 
labels "Hobbes' thesis. "69 However, Rawls delineates the 
limits of state coercion as legitimate only if the 
disadvantages of the loss of liberty are less than the loss 
of liberty from instability. 70 
One final subject for discussion in this section on the 
state and society in liberal philosophy involves liberal 
perspectives on economic systems. While there has been a 
diversity of opinion amongst liberals over the best economic 
system to obtain in the liberal polity, I will elaborate on 
the above quotation about the development of wants and needs 
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Rawls begins his A Theory of Justice by describing the 
primary subject of justice as the basic structure of 
society71 • He proclaims that "[j]ustice is the first 
virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of 
thought." 72 How economic arrangements affect the 
distribution of primary goods in society are intimately tied 
to the justice of a social scheme. "An economic system 
regulates what things are produced and by what means, who 
receives them and in return for which contributions, and how 
large a fraction of social resources is devoted to saving 
and to the provision of public goods. "73 
Another important level of interaction relevant to this 
thesis between the individual and the context of choice is 
the liberal conception how society influences wants. Rawls 
articulates this belief which he holds is perfectly obvious 
and universally recognized: 
The social system shapes the wants and aspirations 
that its citizens come to have. It determines in 
part the sort of person they want to be as well as 
the sort of persons they are. Thus an economic 
system is not only an institutional device for 
satisfying existing wants and needs but a way of 
creating and fashioning wants in the future. How 
men work together now to satisfy their present 
desires affects the desires they will have later 
on, the kind of person they will be. 74 
71 Ibid, p. 3 . 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid, p. 266. 
74 Ibid, p. 259. 
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The connection between economic systems and wants and needs 
Rawls notes is stressed by economists from many perspectives 
including Marx and Marshall75 • 
Rawls variously mentions the following background 
institutions in the choice of a just system: competitive 
markets, private property in the means of production76 , 
efficiency, 77 stability78 , "discouraging desires which 
conflict with the principles of justice" 79 such as envy, 
preventing the establishment of monopolistic restrictions 
and barriers, guaranteeing a free choice of occupations, a 
certain minimum income to all citizens, establishing a 
negative income tax80 and the regulation of inheritance 
"provided that the resulting inequalities are to the 
advantage of the least fortunate and compatible with liberty 
and fair equality of opportunity. "81 Rawls holds that his 
theory of justice admits a number of variations of just 
economic systems, socialist included. 82 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid, p. 7 . 
77 Ibid, p. 360. 
78 Ibid, p. 261. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid, p. 275. 
81 Ibid, p. 278. 
82 Ibid, p. 274. 
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CONCLUSION 
The above eclectic rendering of the presuppositions of 
liberal theory as it pertains to community and individual 
choice is not intended as a comprehensive overview of a body 
of writing and ideas which have had an illustrious history. 
Rather it attempts to draw out features of liberal theory 
which are relevant to this thesis. In the process some of 
liberalism's shortcomings with regard to community and the 
individual have been highlighted. 
One feature of liberalism, as summarized here, is its 
glossing over of the role of community in the development of 
rational agency. In liberal theory, such as that developed 
by Rawls, the development of rational agency appears to 
occur completely in isolation from society. Another feature 
of liberal theory, such as that espoused by Rawls and 
Flathman, is its focus on institutions and arguments of 
justice, which too often leave real policy challenges such 
as minority rights in the shadows. These are sharp 
criticisms which have been leveled at many of the above 
ontological and sociological points. Subsequent chapters 
will highlight such salient criticisms. 
This chapter has relied heavily on the work of Rawls to 
articulate contemporary liberal understandings of community 
as related to the normative choice process, thus it seems 
appropriate before launching into criticisms of liberalism 
to conclude with his definition of community. 
The nature of the self as a free and equal moral 
person is the same for all, and the similarity in 
the basic form of rational plans expresses this 
fact. Moreover, as shown by the notion of society 
as a social union of social unions, the members of 
a community participate in one another's nature: 
we appreciate what others do as things we might 
have done but which they do for us, and what we do 
is similarly done for them. Since the self is 
realized in the activities of many selves, 
relations of justice that conform to principles 
which would be assented to by all are best fitted 
to express the nature of each. Eventually then 
the requirements of a unanimous agreement connect 
up with the idea of human beings who as members of 
a social union seek the values of community. 83 
83 Ibid, p. 565. 
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CHAPTER III 
CRITICS OF LIBERALISM 
But I did not get my picture of the world by 
satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. 
No: it is the inherited background against which I 
distinguish between true and false. 84 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
On Certainty 
Throughout a long history liberalism has sustained 
attack from many quarters. A summary of the critics of 
liberalism during the course of its over two hundred year 
tenure is beyond the possibility of this thesis. Will 
Kymlicka, a liberal theorist responds to the onslaught of 
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deep criticism of liberalism. He writes that critics of the 
liberal tradition have frequently attacked "different 
targets--some discussions are directed at the articulated 
premisses of specific liberal theorists, others at the 
habits and predispositions of liberal-minded politicians and 
jurists, yet others at some more nebulous world-view which 
underlies Western culture generally, not just our political 
84 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, eds. 
G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. Denis 
Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Harper & Row, 
1972) I p. 15e. 
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culture. "85 The body of literature I shall draw on for 
this section critical of liberalism is that of contemporary 
writers whose work is directly relevant to community and the 
context of choice and who have directed their critique of 
liberalism at issues related to community. Amongst these 
voices I shall give prominence to philosophers coming from 
the diverse traditions of communitarian, nee-Aristotelian 
and social democratic theory. 
This chapter shall draw on the work of Alasdair 
Macintyre, Benjamin Barber, Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, 
Michael Walzer, the cooperative work of Robert Bellah, 
Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swindler, and Steven 
Tipton in their book Habits of the Heart, and others. The 
work of these theorists illustrates the narrative of human 
life, the background frameworks of modern identity, the 
meaning of membership in a community, and the limitations of 
American individualism. 
Communitarian critics of liberalism will be prominent 
in this work, but comm.unitarians by no means expound a 
cohesive philosophy86 • The communitarian tendency stands 
85 Kymlicka, 1991, p. 9. 
86 A roster of the communitarian camp is 
nearly as difficult to compose as a precise 
definition of this perspective. However, the 
above authors are included either because they 
label themselves thus, or because they share 
specific criticisms of liberalism with self-
declared comm.unitarians. For this reason Barber 
is included with other comm.unitarians by Bernard 
Yack, "Liberalism and its Communitarian Critics: 
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in a position critical of liberalism which is united in a 
conception of the self as situated in and constituted by 
tradition, with membership in historically rooted community. 
Much of the strength of the communitarian critiques of 
liberalism lies in its response to liberal presuppositions 
about human ontology and state and society. 
This chapter will not match the exact headings that 
were introduced in Chapter II where the presuppositions of 
liberalism were examined. It will respond to some of the 
points and highlight distinctions and conflicts between 
liberal and critical perspectives. 
ONTOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Many critics of liberalism begin their attack on the 
traditional liberal conception of the individual pursuing 
their conceptions of the good in an unencumbered, free and 
self-contained manner. Christopher Lasch believes this to 
be inaccurate. "Liberals regard tradition as a collection 
of prejudices that prevent the individual not only from 
understanding his own needs but also from sympathetic 
Does Liberal Practice 'Live Down' to Liberal 
Theory", in Community in America: The Challenge of 
Habits of the Heart, (Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 1988), p. 147. 
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understanding of others. "87 Further criticism of an 
ontological nature stem from the deontological liberalism 
current today which avoids "reliance on any particular 
theory of the person, at least in the traditional sense of 
attributing to all human beings a determinate nature, or 
certain essential desires and inclinations, such as 
selfishness or sociability, for example88 ". 
Deontological Social Contract Theory 
Particularly susceptible to this battle front is the 
mechanism of the liberal contract theory. While differing 
in content this tool is utilized by such theorists as Kant, 
Rousseau, and John Rawls. The deontological social contract 
theory of Rawls places the choice of the principles of 
justice in a vacuum free from traditions, relationships, and 
circumstances. Some philosophers critical of liberalism 
maintain that this theoretical purity prejudices the choice 
process denying the embeddedness of the self. While not all 
liberals rely on the artifice of a social contract, and the 
work of John Rawls does not represent the definitive liberal 
theory, his prominence in the contemporary field of 
87 Christopher Lasch, "The Communitarian 
Critique of Liberalism," Community in America: The 
Challenge of Habits of the Heart, ed. & intro. 
Charles H. Reynolds and Ralph V. Norman (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1988), 
p. 175. 
88 Sandel, 1982, p. 10. 
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political theory, legal jurisprudence, and liberal 
philosophy position his Theory of Justice as a major target 
for critics of liberalism. 
The theoretical mechanism of social contract theory has 
many liberal champions. Many philosophers have relied upon 
social contract theory as an archimedean point from which to 
prove their claims about principles of justice, political 
reality, and so on. This methodology has been questioned by 
many as fundamentally flawed. 
Alasdair Macintyre astutely observes that although 
Rawls claims that justice as fairness would be chosen by 
rational well-meaning men from behind "a veil of ignorance", 
he denies "the inescapably historical and socially context-
bound character which any substantive set of principles of 
rationality, " 89 or conceptions of the good, inevitably 
have. 
In Michael J. Sandel's book Liberalism and the Limits 
of Justice the work of John Rawls is at the core of his 
critique of liberalism. One of his targets is the validity 
of the Rawlsian social contract theory and its ontological 
implications. Rawls freely admits the hypothetical nature 
of the circumstances of the original position, 90 and 
justifies its validity on the grounds that it reflects our 
89 Ibid, p. 4. 
90 Rawls, 1971, p. 12, 21, 120. 
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inherent sense of justice and moral judgement. 91 Sandel 
writes that the validity of social contract theory does not 
depend on its terms actually having been agreed to, but 
rather on the idea that they would have been agreed to under 
the requisite hypothetical conditions. In fact, Rawls' 
hypothetical social contract is even more imaginary than 
most. Not only did his contract never really happen; it is 
imagined to take place among the sorts of beings who never 
really existed, that is, beings struck with the kind of 
complicated amnesia necessary to the veil of ignorance. In 
this sense, Rawls's theory is doubly hypothetical 92 • 
Sandel goes on to argue that Rawls is forced to rely 
upon such beings in his theory because he recognizes the 
situatedness of humans in practices and conventions of 
justice which are contrary to his deontological commitments. 
"As the self is prior to the ends it affirms, so the 
contract is prior to the principles it generates. Of 
course, .... real persons, ordinarily conceived as 'thick with 
particular traits', are not strictly prior with respect to 
their ends, but are embedded in and conditioned by the 
values and interests and desires from among which the 
'sovereign' self, qua subject of possessions, would take its 
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Charles Taylor in his seminal work Sources of the Self 
has contributed to this critique of social contract theory 
with a discussion of the modern notion of freedom. 
The ancient notion of the good, either in the 
Platonic mode, as the key to cosmic order, or in 
the form of the good life a'la Aristotle, sets a 
standard for us in nature, independent of our 
will. The modern notion of freedom which develops 
in the seventeenth century portrays this as the 
independence of the subject, his determining of 
his own purposes without interference from 
external authority .... Normative orders must 
originate in the will. This is most evident in 
the seventeenth century political theory of 
legitimacy through contract. As against earlier 
contract theories, the one we find with Grotius 
and Locke starts from the individual. 94 
While not all liberals have relied upon the device of 
the social contract to build their cases for liberalism, it 
has been an important tradition to liberal philosophy and 
hence frequently has served as a target for critics of 
liberalism. 
Agency and Choice 
The concept of autonomy is a central presupposition of 
the liberal experiment and of much Western morality as well. 
As Charles Taylor phrases it: "To talk of universal, 
natural, or human rights is to connect respect for human 
life and integrity with the notion of autonomy. It is to 
conceive of people as active cooperators in establishing and 
ensuring the respect which is due them .... So autonomy has a 
94 Taylor, 1989, p. 82. 
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central place in our understanding of respect. "95 As seen 
in the previous chapter Rawls defines autonomous choice of 
principles as completely divorced from all social forces, or 
a person is not acting autonomously, but heteronomously. 
Sandel asserts that the centrality of choice to Rawls's 
theory of justice is essential for his deontological 
priority of the self and his priority of procedure which 
"require the voluntarist notions of agency and 
justification. For the self to be prior, its aims must be 
chosen rather than given; for contract to be prior, the 
principles of justice must be products of agreement rather 
than objects of discovery. "96 
Sandel's discussion of the Rawlsian conception of 
choice and the role of reflection and agency is an important 
one. Sandel understands "human agency as the faculty by 
which the self comes by its ends. "97 Sandel holds that 
Rawls's principles of justice are antecedently derived, 
since they are in force as soon as the veil of ignorance is 
removed. Therefore, human agency is not exercised in the 
choice of the principles. Furthermore, Sandel points out 
that even after the veil of ignorance has been lifted in 
choosing individual conceptions of the good, Rawls presents 
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free to choose according to their needs and desires and at 
other points presenting limiting conditions. One limitation 
is that the principles of justice will take priority when 
plans of life clash with them, so not all conceivable plans 
of life will conform to justice as fairness. Another 
narrowing circumstance according to Sandel is that: 
at times Rawls writes as though the principles of 
justice shape a person's conception of the good 
from the start, even as the conception is 
formulated ... At other times Rawls seems to favor 
the second account, as when he writes that in 
justice as fairness, persons 'implicitly 
agree .... to conform their conceptions of the good 
to what the principles of justice require, or at 
least not to press claims which directly violate 
them' . 98 
A further constraint on the Rawlsian circumstances of 
choice are the counting principles (as outlined on page 21-2 
of this thesis), which Sandel states "amount roughly to the 
basic tenets of instrumental rationality. "99 
In Sandel's discussion of agency in A Theory of Justice 
he reconstructs the deontological subject of Rawls's theory. 
In Rawls's scheme of things, agency and ends ultimately are 
found under the conception of the good. "Like the right, 
the good is conceived voluntaristically; it is founded in 
choice. As the principles of right are the product of a 
collective choice in the original position, conceptions of 
the good are the products of individual choices in the real 




The voluntarist notion of agency in the choice process 
of rational life plans demonstrates the impoverished notion 
of reflection found in Rawls . 101 While Rawls admits that 
reflection is part of the principles of rationality, Sandel 
holds that he then limits the objects of reflection to "(1) 
the various alternative plans and their likely consequences 
for the realization of the agent's desires, and (2) the 
agent's wants and desires themselves, and their relative 
intensities. 11102 Sandel' s critique of Rawls' (1) is that it 
is an outward not inward form of reflection and is a "kind 
of prudential reasoning 11103 , and (2) is a relatively 
superficial self-reflection, examining wants and desires not 
the self. "Since for Rawls the faculty of self-reflection 
is limited to weighing the relative intensity of existing 
wants and desires, the deliberation it entails cannot 
inquire into the identity of the agent, ('Who am ~' 
really?') only into feelings and sentiments of the agent 
('What do I really feel like or most prefer?'). Because 
this sort of deliberation is restricted to assessing the 
desires of a subject whose identity is given 
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understanding in the strong sense which enables the agent to 
participate in the constitution of its identity. 11104 
Sandel points out that reflection on the type of beings 
in Rawls's world of justice is not possible, 
first because the kind of beings we are is 
antecedently given and not subject to revision in 
the light of reflection or any other form of 
agency, and second, because Rawls' self is 
conceived as barren of constituent traits, 
possessed only of contingent attributes held 
always at a certain distance, and so there is 
nothing in the self for reflection to survey or 
apprehend. For Rawls, the identity of the subject 
can never be at stake in moments of choice or 
deliberation (although its future aims and 
attributes may of course be affected) , for the 
bounds that define it are beyond the reach of the 
agency -- whether voluntarist or cognitive -- that 
would contribute to its transformation. 105 
Although Sandel's criticisms go beyond the paucity of 
Rawlsian agents potential for reflection to his whole 
theory, it is obvious that Rawls' beings are "incapable of 
making sense of what choice and deliberation could possibly 
consist of 11 106 , which is essential here. 
If the good is nothing more than the 
indiscriminate satisfaction of arbitrarily-given 
preferences, regardless of worth, it is not 
difficult to imagine that the right (and for that 
matter a good many other sorts of claims) must 
outweigh it. But in fact the morally diminished 
status of the good must inevitably call into 
question the status of justice as well. For once 
it is conceded that our conceptions of the good 
are morally arbitrary, it becomes difficult to see 





Ibid, p. 161. 
Ibid. 
50 
the one that enables us to pursue these arbitrary 
conceptions 'as fully as circumstances 
permit' . 107 
Benjamin Barber in his collection of essays The 
Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times 
highlights the difficulties encountered in Rawlsian 
conception of rationality and choice. The recipe for 
guiding choice in uncertain conditions is referred to as the 
maximin rule meaning "the maximum minimorum; and the rule 
directs our attention to the worst that can happen under any 
proposed course of action, and to decide in the light of 
that. "108 Rawls projects that because of circumstances of 
uncertainty for individuals in the original position, it is 
rational to choose the more conservative options. Is this 
yet another sighting of the Rawlsian hypothetical being? 
As Barber points out there are other rules which parties 
might apply to their choices in this situation such as a 
moderate-risk strategy, 
whose aim would be to create the possibility of 
somewhat greater gains than those afforded the 
maximin, even at the risk of somewhat greater 
possible losses. Indeed, the scarcity built into 
all contractarian views of society--and Rawls's is 
no exception on this point--enhances the 
attractiveness of gambling strategies that, should 
the individual win, permit him far greater 
benefits than those allowed by an austere 
egalitarianism .... Lotteries function precisely on 
this basis. Given still more radical assumptions 
about attitudes towards risk, one can contend that 
some men may choose rationally to risk starvation, 
107 Ibid, p. 168. 
lOB Rawls, 1971, p. 154. 
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even death, for the chance--even against the odds-
-to be very rich or very powerful. War is an 
extreme but hardly irrational example of this win-
all/lose-all strategy. The development of 
capitalism is scarcely thinkable in the absence of 
high-risk attitudes in the face of uncertainty. A 
consideration of actual historical developments 
and concrete institutions as they manifest special 
psychologies may in fact suggest that the no-risk 
predilection for security is atypical of human 
choice in the face of uncertainty. 109 
Taylor is critical of the disengaged self-responsible 
agent of Locke and Kant. He holds that this is not only an 
erroneous perspective of agency, but that it is unnecessary 
as a support to self-responsible reason and freedom. Taylor 
states that while understandable "it involves reading the 
stance of disengagement, whereby we objectify facets of our 
own being, into the ontology of the subject, as though we 
were by nature an agency separable from everything merely 
given in us. 11110 
Rationality and the Good 
Alasdair Macintyre is also an important critic of 
liberalism. In his book Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
he narrates the history of four traditions of enquiry 
connecting justice with understandings of practical 
rationality111 • In this study Macintyre's astute 
109 Barber, 1988, p. 63. 
110 Taylor, 1989, p. 514. 
111 The four traditions Macintyre examines 
are Aristotelian, Augustinian, Humean, and 
Liberal. Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which 
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scholarship is brought to bear on the works of contemporary 
liberal philosophy. He alludes to the work of Rawlsian 
rationality when he writes: 
Rationality requires, so it has been argued by a 
number of academic philosophers, that we first 
divest ourselves of allegiance to any one of the 
contending theories and also abstract ourselves 
from all those particularities of social 
relationship in terms of which we have been 
accustomed to understand our responsibilities and 
interests. Only by so doing, it has been 
suggested, shall we arrive at a genuinely neutral, 
impartial, and, in this way, universal point of 
view, freed from the partisanship and the 
partiality and onesidedness that otherwise affect 
us. And only by so doing shall we be able to 
evaluate the contending accounts of justice 
rationally. 112 
Macintyre goes on to point out that the notion of "ideal 
rationality as consisting in the principles which a socially 
disembodied being would arrive at illegitimately ignores the 
inescapable historically and socially context-bound 
character which any substantive set of principles of 
rationality, whether theoretical or practical, is bound to 
have. 11113 
Furthermore, Macintyre disputes the neutrality between 
conceptions of the good claimed by liberals. "Thus 
liberalism, while initially rejecting the claims of any 
overriding theory of the good, does in fact come to embody 
Rationality? (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988). 
112 
113 
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just such a theory .... Like other traditions liberalism has 
internal to it its own standards of rational 
justification. "114 
In Macintyre's A Short History of Ethics his 
understanding of Aristotelian ethics and choice is 
demonstrated by human rationality "in two kinds of 
activities: in thinking, where reasoning is what constitutes 
the activity itself; and in such activities other than 
thinking where we may succeed or fail in obeying the 
precepts of reason 11115 • Human success or failure in 
following the course of reason is the basis for virtue, and 
virtuous action is the result of free choice; "We are not 
called good or bad, we are not praised or blamed, by reason 
of our emotions or capacities. It is rather what we choose 
to do with them that entitles us to be called virtuous or 
vicious. "116 
Virtuous action must also be completely voluntary, i.e. 
not done under circumstances of compulsion or due to 
ignorance: 117 "voluntary action in a positive sense is that 
114 Ibid, p. 345. 
115 Alasdair Macintyre, A Short History of 
Ethics (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co., 
Inc., 1966), p. 64. 
116 Ibid, p. 65. 
117 Actions done through moral ignorance -
of what constitutes virtues and vice - are not 
exculpatory. Ibid, p. 70. 
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choice and deliberation have a key role in it. "118 
Macintyre notes that "[a]ccording to liberalism, individuals 
and groups not only do but should develop and pursue their 
conceptions of good 'voluntarily,' and where this is the 
case these conceptions have differed widely and can be 
expected to continue to do so. 11119 According to 
Macintyre's interpretation of Aristotle, the claim is not 
being made that humans are only rational creatures, rather 
that "the standards by which men judge their own actions are 
those of reason .... and that men characteristically act 
rationally. 11120 
The whole discussion of human rationality and the 
process of rational choice has many risks involved, 
particularly if the philosopher claims it is done outside a 
communal context. As Charles Taylor points out arrogance 
and ethnocentricism may result when attempting to define 
rationality in isolation from how particular cultures 
articulate their differing conceptions of the world and 
human action. 121 Taylor also notes the preeminence of 
rationality in the Kantian universal scheme of things and 
118 Ibid, p. 71. 
119 Flathman, 1989, p. 8. 
120 Macintyre, 1966, p. 73. 
121 Charles Taylor, "Rationality," 
Rationality and Relativism, ed. Martin Hollis and 
Steven Lukes, 4th ed. {Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
1989) I p • 104-5. 
the dangers this can pose. 
Kant shares the modern stress on freedom as self-
determination. He insists on seeing the moral law 
as one which emanates from our will. Our awe 
before it reflects the status of rational agency, 
its author, and whose being it expresses. 
Rational agents have a status that nothing else 
enjoys in the universe. They soar above the rest 
of creation. 122 
An understanding of the nature of choices concerned 
only with how we should act123 , determined by a set of 
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rules for conduct of a single standard, or possibly measured 
in terms of fulfillment of desire124 , or maybe explained in 
terms of enlightened self-interest, is the norm in 
contemporary philosophy. However, as Taylor and others 
point out, this theoretical certitude does little to 
describe the choice process of the individual in a complex 
environment where rationality is rarely the overriding 
consideration. 
122 Taylor, 1989, p. 83. 
123 The standard in contemporary philosophy 
is to give a narrow focus to issues of morality. 
"Morality is conceived purely as a guide to 
action .... the major contenders in these stakes 
are utilitarianism, and different derivations of 
Kant's theory, which are action focussed and offer 
answers exactly of this kind." {Taylor, 1989, p. 
79.) 
124 Taylor maintains that utilitarianism 
leads the field in denying that there are 
qualitative distinctions of good. "A good, 
happiness, is recognized. But this is 
characterized by a polemical refusal of any 
qualitative discrimination .... There is just 
desire, and the only standard which remains is the 
maximization of its fulfillment." {Taylor, 1989, 
p. 78). 
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Larmore notes that "[a]n abiding assumption of much of 
moral philosophy has been that ultimately there must be a 
single source of moral value. The continual controversy 
between 'deontological' and 'consequentialist' theories is 
an important example of this simplification. Kantians and 
utilitarians, the best-known protagonists of these two 
camps, have both supposed that in the last analysis the 
structure of morality must be either deontological 
(involving a set of absolute duties we must heed whatever 
others may do as a result of what we do) or consequentialist 
(demanding that we bring about the greatest good overall, so 
that what we ought to do depends on how we expect others to 
react to what we do) . " 125 
Atomism and Identity 
As noted earlier, the liberal concept of autonomy is 
the basis of respecting the individual. However, many 
communitarians and critics of liberalism maintain that in 
addition to the respect due an individual based on their 
rationality and autonomy, the word "respect" and how it is 
translated is only rendered coherent to members in a 
particular community. The concept of membership is central 
to the work of Michael Walzer in Spheres of Justice: A 
Defense of Pluralism and Equality. "The primary good that 
125 Charles E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral 
Complexity, (Columbia University, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. xi. 
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we distribute to one another is membership in some human 
conununity. 11126 For it is only as members somewhere that 
men and women can hope to share in all the other social 
goods--security, wealth, honor, office, and power--that 
conununal life makes possible. 
The development of the atomistic presupposition of 
liberalism is addressed by Elizabeth Wolgast in her book The 
Grammar of Justice, which describes the historical 
development of the theoretical construct of the atomistic 
individual. 
Standing against the old authorities required a 
secure point, an Archimedean point from which to 
strike. So it happened that in a variety of 
fields--science, theology, political theory, 
morality--such a point was located in the 
autonomous, unconnected, rational human 
individual. Starting with this person and his or 
her inherent abilities, requirements and values, 
one got a neutral and detached perspective on any 
claim to authority. Thus a new kind of moral, 
political and epistemological justification came 
into being, one that derived from the natural, 
free, rational, and morally autonomous 
individual . 127 
Prominent in the works of Macintyre and Taylor is their 
exploration of the concept of modern identity, and the 
consequences of the liberal atomistic self. Charles Taylor 
in his work on Hegel writes: 
126 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A 
Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1983), p. 31. 
127 Elizabeth H. Wolgast, The Grammar of 
Justice {Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1987), p. 2. 
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We can think that the individual is what he is in 
abstraction from his community only if we are 
thinking of him qua organism. But when we think 
of a human being, we do not simply mean a living 
organism, but a being who can think, feel, decide, 
be moved, respond, enter into relations with 
others; and all this implies a language, a related 
set of ways of experiencing the world, of 
interpreting his feelings, understanding his 
relation to others, to the past, the future, the 
absolute, and so on. It is the particular way he 
situates himself within this cultural world that 
we call his identity. 120 
The social contract theory of Rawls and the portrait of 
choice presented in his theory of justice mock this rich 
situatedness. The atomism fostered by liberal rights based 
moral and legal philosophy in modernity has consequences for 
the modern identity and also the community. "An 
instrumental stance to our own feelings divides us from 
within, splits reason from sense. And the atomistic focus 
on our individual goals dissolves community and divides us 
f ram each other. 11129 
Taylor articulates the connections between the self and 
the community, providing the context for theory grounded in 
contemporary realities. "And only in this way was it 
possible to show the connections between the modern moral 
outlook and its multiple sources, on one hand, and the 
different evolving conceptions of the self and its 
12° Charles Taylor, "Hegel: History and 
Politics," in Liberalism and its Critics, ed. 
Michael Sandel, (New York: New York University 
Press, 1984), p. 182. 
129 Taylor, p. 500-1. 
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characteristic powers, on the other; and to show also how 
these concepts of the self are connected with certain 
notions of inwardness, which are thus peculiarly modern and 
are themselves interwoven with the moral outlook. "130 
Macintyre poses a challenge to the individualism of 
modernity by presenting a pre-modern understanding of the 
self as part of a lifelong narrative: "A concept of a self 
whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links 
birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to 
end". 131 As Sandel succinctly summarizes this criticism of 
liberalism, "in contrast to the liberal's unencumbered self, 
Macintyre proposes a narrative conception of the self, a 
self constituted in part by a life story with a certain 
telos, or point. As the telos is not fixed or fully 
identifiable in advance, the unity of a life is the unity of 
a narrative quest, a quest whose object is a fuller and more 
adequate grasp of a good only intimated at the outset." 132 
Macintyre notes that not only does the unity of a 
narrative self hold the individual accountable for their 
actions, but that other narratives are woven into the 
individual self, thus making all intelligible. "The 
narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of 
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accountability presuppose the applicability of the concept 
of personal identity, just as it presupposes their 
applicability and just as indeed each of these three 
presupposes the applicability of the two others. The 
relationship is one of mutual presupposition. " 133 
THE STATE AND SOCIETY 
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Many of the basic issues about identity and what it is 
to be human in the dominant liberal theory are deeply 
questioned by communitarians and others. However, this is 
but one front of the attack on liberalism. There are also 
many critical of liberal presuppositions about state and 
society as well as problems which are perceived as the 
inheritance of modern liberal societies. 
Neutrality and Pluralism 
Much contemporary political theory shares the 
presupposition of the human capacity of agency. While Rawls 
places limitations on this capacity in the choice of the 
principles of justice, and as argued above, even in the 
choice of conceptions of the good, communitarians would 
place agency in a context of community, recognizing the 
situatedness of humans in their common language and 
133 Macintyre, 1984, p. 218. 
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traditions. Both communitarians and liberals would argue 
that in order for conceptions of the good to proliferate, a 
climate of tolerance must be present. 
One of the conditions of a liberal society is the 
concept of pluralism. Liberals like Larmore would hold that 
neutrality of the state is the best way for a climate of 
toleration to flourish. Yet communitarians would point out 
that the atomistic individualism in modern society is 
vulnerable to alienation134 and anomie. These conditions 
lead more to anarchy than a condition of pluralism. Many 
communitarians share the belief "that intolerance flourishes 
most where forms of life are dislocated, roots unsettled, 
traditions undone. In our day, the totalitarian impulse has 
sprung less from the convictions of confidently situated 
selves than from the confusion of atomized, dislocated, 
frustrated selves, at sea in a world where common meanings 
have lost their force. "135 
The liberal assertion that state neutrality is the best 
way for pluralism to flourish has been questioned by many 
critics. This extensive debate is not over the ideal of 
neutrality but over its possibility. Liberal critics, from 
many quarters, would hold that what is often passed off as 
134 Taylor defines alienation as when "norms 
as expressed in public practices cease to hold our 
allegiance. They are either seen as irrelevant or 
are decried as usurpation". Taylor, 1984, p. 186. 
135 Sandel, 1984, p. 7. 
neutrality is nothing of the sort, but the promoting of 
liberal values and a liberal conception of the good. 
Dworkin's definition of liberal equality as state 
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neutrality vis-a-vis conceptions of the good, is interesting 
in light of Hegel's comments as interpreted by Taylor. That 
"the modern ideology of equality and of total participation 
leads to a homogenization of society. "136 Taylor holds 
that homogenization will eventually lead to the destruction 
of pluralism, which is a central tenet of liberalism; in 
other words, liberalism's commitment to neutrality is 
destructive to the very qualities it is intended to promote. 
Michael Walzer's insights into pluralism note the 
limitations of pluralism and the particularity of this 
concept. The relativity of his understanding distinguishes· 
his theory from liberalism, although at times he has called 
himself a liberal. 
Even if we choose pluralism, as I shall do, that 
choice still requires a coherent defense. There 
must be principles that justify the choice and set 
limits to it, for pluralism does not require us to 
endorse every proposed distributive criteria or to 
accept every would-be agent. Conceivably, there 
is a single principle and a single legitimate kind 
of pluralism. But this would still be a pluralism 
that encompassed a wide range of distributions. 
By contrast, the deepest assumption of most of the 
philosophers who have written about justice, from 
Plato onwards, is that there is one, and only one, 
distributive system that philosophy can rightly 
encompass . 137 
136 
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Conflict and Stability 
The liberal presupposition that the role of the state 
is to minimize the inevitable conflict and thus nurture a 
stable environment138 is also shared by many critics of 
liberalism. The recognition that this foundation is one of 
liberalism's strengths is eloquently stated by Benjamin 
Barber: 
[L]iberal philosophy possesses important political 
strengths--above all, the capacity to endow its 
institutions with stability and to provide rights 
and liberties (including property) with a powerful 
bulwark against statist tyranny. Nowhere were its 
strengths more visible than in the struggles for 
emancipation from feudalism, hierarchy, and 
absolute monarchy that were the political 
signature of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Liberal theory as dissent theory 
created an ideology of emancipation crucial to the 
emergence of the modern democratic state. Yet in 
democratic times, when the initial emancipatory 
struggles are concluded, philosophies of 
resistance lose much of their political force. To 
posit and then theorize the individual as an 
abstract solitary may be helpful on the way to 
loosening feudal bonds and demarcating a clear 
space for rebels attempting to individuate 
themselves from a hierarchical and oppressive 
order. But it may appear as an obstructive 
exercise in nostalgia in an era when the extent 
and quality of citizenship are in question and 
when the bonds that hold together free communities 
are growing slack. 139 
As pointed out in the section on conflict and stability 
in Chapter II, liberals condone the state's right to 
138 Ackerman's #3, relative scarcity leads 
to conflict, #4, #5, & #6 further define the 
inevitability of conflict and its desired 
minimization. 
139 Barber, 1988, p. 18-19. 
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coercion only if citizens would loose greater liberty due to 
instability. However, while many critics of liberalism 
examined in this thesis would agree that stability is 
desirable - and that the institutions of the modern state 
and representative democracy ideally promote stability -
they might question how this ideal has translated into 
practice in the modern liberal state. 
Taylor writes that an assumption of much of modern 
political theory has to do with the purpose of society. 
"Society was justified not by what it was or expressed, but 
by what it achieved, the fulfillment of men's needs, desires 
and purposes. Society came to be seen as an instrument and 
its different modes and structures were to be studied 
scientifically for their effects on human happiness. 11140 
Taylor observes that the instrumentalist inclination of 
modern society141 has public consequences for the heal th of 
democratic society. Necessary conditions for self-
government include: 
a strong sense of identification of the citizens 
with their public institutions and political way 
of life, and may also involve some 
decentralization of power when the central 
institutions are too distant and bureaucratized to 
sustain a continuing sense of participation by 
themselves. These conditions are under threat in 
our highly concentrated and mobile societies, 
140 Taylor, 1984, p. 191. 
141 Taylor holds that over the last two 
centuries the disengaged instrumental mode of 
life, has been central to the most influential 
theories of modernity. Taylor, 1989, p. 499. 
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which are so dominated by instrumentalist 
considerations in both economic and defense 
policies. What is worse, the atomist outlook 
which instrumentalism fosters makes people unaware 
of these conditions, so that they happily support 
policies which undermine them--as in the recent 
rash of nee-conservative measures in Britain and 
the United States, which cut welfare programmes 
and regressively redistribute income, thus eroding 
the bases of community identification. 142 
While the atomist inclination of liberalism has been 
discussed earlier, Taylor notes that this inclination is 
exacerbated by the instrumental tendency toward stability in 
modern society. Taylor's discussion of the homogenization 
of modern society ref erred to earlier is a further danger in 
the quest for stability. 
Modern societies have moved towards much greater 
homogeneity and greater interdependence, so that 
partial communities have lost their autonomy and 
to some extent their identity. But great 
differences remain; only because of the ideology 
of homogeneity, these differential characteristics 
no longer have meaning and value for those who 
have them. Thus the rural population is taught by 
the mass media to see itself as lacking in some of 
the advantages of a more advanced life style. The 
poor are seen as marginal to society in America, 
and in some ways have a worse lot than in more 
recognizedly class-divided societies. 143 
In modern capitalist America there is no distinction between 
poverty--being poor--and frugality, and little dignity in 
any condition of scarcity, chosen or inherited. It can be 
safely stated that American consumption patterns (consuming 
over 60% of the world's resources) combined with the social 
142 Ibid, p. 505. 
143 Taylor, 1984, p. 193-4. 
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rejection of principles of frugality is already having 
significant consequences for the sustainable future of the 
global environment. 
Homogenization thus frequently increases minority 
alienation and resentment. And the first response of 
liberal society is to try even more of the same: programs to 
eliminate poverty, or assimilate Indians, move populations 
out of declining regions, bring an urban way of life to the 
countryside, etc .. 144 While this reduction of certain 
distinguishing features may have some immediate benefits in 
promoting stability and reducing conflict, its long-term 
impact on the pluralism and diversity necessary for the 
liberal polity are a subject of debate. 
Public versus Private 
Another challenge facing liberalism is that rights-
based political and legal liberalism has been unable to 
recognize the essential bond between member and 
community . 145 By ignoring that relationship in the 
theoretic realm, the political system and its policies based 
144 Ibid, p. 194. 
145 Sandel holds that "whether egalitarian 
or libertarian, rights-based liberalism begins 
with the claims that we are separate, individual 
persons, each with our own aims, interests, and 
conceptions of the good, and seeks a framework of 
rights that will enable us to realize our capacity 
as free moral agents, consistent with a similar 
liberty for others." Sandel, 1984, p. 4. 
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on individual rights has contributed to a deterioration in 
the quality of modern life. Further, some critics maintain 
that rights based liberalism has done grave damage to the 
community as well as to the individual. This position might 
further assert that the atomistic focus of the dominant 
post-Enlightenment philosophical tradition has denied the 
strength and necessity of this relationship, and thus, 
misunderstood human needs and interests. 
Examining the instrumental view of society through a 
liberal lens one finds the basic concept that civil society 
is the result of voluntary association developed in order to 
advance private purposes more effectively. Christopher 
Lasch summarizes this liberal tendency, "its solitude for 
individual rights extends to the right of association, but 
it finds it hard to conceive of voluntary associations 
except as pressure groups seeking to influence public policy 
in their own favor. 11146 Lasch further writes that his 
objection to this perspective is that "it is too narrow a 
conception of the public interest. 11147 
The distinction between public and private, so 
dear to liberals, doesn't catch the important 
concerns, the ones that really matter. On the one 
hand, it takes too narrow a view of the public 
146 Christopher Lasch, "The Communitarian 
Critique of Liberalism," Community in America: The 
Challenge of Habits of the Heart, ed. & intro. by 
Charles H. Reynolds, and Ralph V. Norman 
(Berkeley, California: University of California 
Press, 1988), p. 183. 
147 Ibid. 
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interest. On the other hand it trivializes the 
activities that need to be protected and 
nourished. Liberalism is at its best when it 
condemns invasions of privacy; but this best is 
still not good enough. The concept of privacy has 
no moral content. It equates freedom not with 
submission to an exacting discipline but with the 
absence of constraint, the right to do as one 
pleases, the right to change one's mind every day. 
Both liberals and so-called conservatives adhere 
to this empty ideal of freedom and privacy; they 
disagree only about what is truly private. 148 
Taylor adds to this thought the insight of Hegel who 
believed that with the coming of individualism "men cease to 
identify with the community's life, when they 'reflect', 
that is, turn back on themselves, and see themselves most 
importantly as individuals with individual goals .... the most 
meaningful experience, which seems to him most vital, to 
touch most the core of his being, is private. "149 
Among Sandel's criticism of Rawls is the conception of 
community on which his theory of justice is premised. While 
Rawls provides two accounts of community, instrumental 150 
and sentimental, 1 51 both are premised on the 
148 Ibid, p. 184. 
149 Taylor, 1984, p. 186-7. 
150 "Subjects of co-operation are assumed to 
be governed by self-interested motivations alone, 
and the good of community consists solely in the 
advantages individuals derive from co-operating in 
pursuit of their egotistic ends." Sandel, 1982, 
p. 148. 
151 "The good of community for Rawls 
consists not only in the direct benefits of social 
co-operation but also in the quality of 
motivations and ties of sentiment that may attend 
this cooperation and be enhanced in the process." 
individualistic self. 
So it would appear that community in the strong, 
constitutive sense required by both Rawls and 
Dworkin cannot be accounted for by a conception 
that is individualistic even in Rawls' special 
sense of the term. For the individualistic 
account takes the bounds of the subject as 
antecedently given and finally fixed, but Rawls 
and Dworkin require a conception capable of 
marking out a wider subject of possession, a 
conception in which the subject is empowered to 
participate in the constitution of its 
identity. 152 
As discussed in the previous section Rawls' account of 
agency is truncated and thus disallows the individual 
required by his understanding of community. 
The work of Bellah et al in Habits of the Heart: 
Individualism and Commitment in American Life uses a 
descriptive mode of research and writing to comment on the 
state of American life in the words of ordinary citizens. 
Through questioning individuals about their values, 
commitments, and the problems they perceive in their 
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community the authors of this experiment examine "the extent 
to which private life either prepares people to take part in 
the public world or encourages them to find meaning 
exclusively in the private sphere, and the degree to which 
public life fulfills our private aspirations or discourages 
us so much that we withdraw from involvement in it. 11153 
Ibid, p. 149. 
152 Ibid, p. 152 
153 Bellah, 1985, p. ix. 
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Their reasons for such an investigation were dictated by 
their concern that moral questions in contemporary American 
society are too frequently relegated to the realm of private 
anxiety, "as if it would be awkward or embarrassing to make 
it public ... [m]any doubt that we have enough in common to be 
able to mutually to discuss our central aspirations and 
fears. "154 
In the history of liberal theory, discussions of 
private versus public concerns have frequently been 
addressed. However in contemporary versions of this debate 
the critics of liberalism have leveled some particularly 
deep criticisms at liberal theorists. It may be the 
particular crises which contemporary societies are facing, 
as well as the particular articulations of liberal theory 
which are currently in the dominant position, which add fuel 
to these criticisms. 
CONCLUSION 
While liberals recognize the need for certain social 
preconditions in which liberalism can flourish, critics are 
quick to point out that there are many aspects of 
contemporary society which are not incorporated in liberal 
theory or addressed as real problems by liberal theorists: 
154 Ibid, p. vii. 
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the instrumental nature of modernity, the homogenization of 
plural society, the dangers of individualistic atomism, 
anomie, and alienation. This situation leads to theory 
which is insulated from the challenges of contemporary life, 
and whose conclusions may well be inaccurate or even 
irrelevant. 
A number of unifying features are found among the 
critics of liberalism examined in this chapter. First, John 
Rawls and deontological liberalism are central targets. 
Second, concern about community and real challenges facing 
American society are expressed. Third, the voices listened 
to are united in identifying the inadequacy of the liberal 
portrait of the disengaged self. Whether it is Macintyre's 
narrative self, or Sandel's embedded self, they all plead to 
widen the liberal ontology (or to completely replace it) : 
crediting factors beyond the narrow confines of the 
atomistic disengaged self. Many state the purpose of this 
plea as dissatisfaction with liberal theory's understanding 
of the relationship between the individual and community and 
the damage that this has done. 
However, these critics of liberalism also share, in the 
analysis of this thesis, serious theoretical limitations in 
providing a viable replacement for the leading philosophical 
paradigm of contemporary American society, liberalism. 
While many of their criticisms are persuasive and their 
prose eloquent, they fail to challenge the theoretical 
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strength of liberalism's theory of justice and expression of 
individual rights vis-a-vis a bureaucratized, centralized 
and sometimes oppressive state. The recognition that 
liberalism still remains the preeminent philosophical option 
does not (and should not) insulate it from criticism. It is 
toward those philosophers from within this tradition that 




It is a commonplace amongst communitarians, 
socialists, and feminists alike that liberalism is 
to be rejected for its excessive 'individualism' 
or 'atomism', for ignoring the manifest ways in 
which we are 'embedded' or 'situated' in various 
social roles and communal relationships. The 
effect of these theoretical flaws is that 
liberalism, in a misguided attempt to protect and 
promote the dignity and autonomy of the 
individual, has undermined the associations and 




Liberalism, Community and Culture 
The communitarian attack on liberalism has not gone 
unanswered by liberals. The deep criticism of liberalism's 
shortcomings have led some liberals to reexamine their own 
traditions and reformulate liberal responses according to 
contemporary challenges. 
A leader in this renewed liberalism is Will Kymlicka. 
In his book Liberalism, Community and Culture he is critical 
of liberal indifference or hostility towards collective 
rights of minority cultures, but nonetheless aligns himself 




Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and 
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 
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broader account of individual membership in a community and 
a culture and how the liberal polity could better address 
real policy issues such as that presented by the dilemma of 
minority rights. 
The recent work of William A. Galston, Liberal 
Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State 
also addresses from within the liberal tradition many 
problems identified by critics of liberalism. Galston uses 
a discussion of the current trend within liberalism of state 
neutrality (e.g. Rawls and Larmore) to begin articulating 
the list of implicit liberal virtues. Concerned with the 
depth of problems in contemporary American society, Galston 
confronts the deep criticism of liberalism from many 
quarters by noting the lack of clear liberal civic virtues 
and the policy implications of this situation. 
The work of these two liberal philosophers will be the 
focus of this chapter and will include their dissatisfaction 
with contemporary liberal articulations and their responses 
to communitarian critiques. 
WILL KYMLICKA 
Will Kymlicka's introduction clarifies his underlying 
perspective on liberalism and community. He declares his 
intent to focus on liberalism's "broader account of the 
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relationship between the individual and society--and, in 
particular, of the individual's membership in a community 
and a culture. "156 He attempts to demonstrate through his 
argument that "the liberal view is sensitive to the way our 
individual lives and shared moral deliberations are related 
to, and situated in a shared social context. "157 
Kymlicka maintains that liberal understandings of 
community are not necessarily in conflict with the liberal 
concern for the individual and the relationship between the 
individual and the state. He makes explicit his 
dissatisfaction with the communitarian discussion of 
community and culture and also the liberal response (or 
absence of) to the collective rights of minority cultures. 
The Individual. Choice. and Pluralism 
Kymlicka begins his response to critics of liberalism 
by summarizing and articulating certain core concerns of 
liberal theory related to the individual and community which 
have been under communitarian fire. 
So we have two preconditions for the fulfillment 
of our essential interest in leading a life that 
is good. One is that we lead our lives from the 
inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what 
gives value to life; the other is that we be free 
to question those beliefs, to examine them in 
light of whatever information and examples and 
arguments our culture can provide. Individuals 
must therefore have the resources and liberties 
156 
157 
Ibid, p. 1. 
Ibid, p. 2. 
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needed to live their lives in accordance with 
their beliefs about value .... Hence the 
traditional concern for civil and personal 
liberties. And individuals must have the cultural 
conditions conducive to acquiring an awareness of 
different views about the good life, and to 
acquiring an ability to intelligently examine and 
re-examine those views. Hence the equally 
traditional liberal concern for education, freedom 
of expression, freedom of the press, artistic 
freedom, etc. These liberties enable us to judge 
what is valuable in life in the only way we can 
judge such things--i.e. by exploring different 
aspects of our collective cultural heritage. 158 
The above account of the political morality of modern 
liberalism would not come to most people's minds when 
describing liberalism. More often liberals and critics 
would emphasize abstract individualism and skepticism about 
the good. Nevertheless, Kymlicka maintains that the 
accepted liberal wisdom has very little basis in the 
theories of Mill, and that even Rawls and Dworkin are 
frequently misunderstood. "According to liberalism, since 
our most essential interest is in getting these beliefs 
right and acting on them, government treats people as 
equals, with equal concern and respect, by providing for 
each individual the liberties and resources needed to 
examine and act on these beliefs. This requirement forms 
the basis of contemporary liberal theories of justice. 11159 
Kymlicka holds that "the importance liberal societies 
attach to freedom of expression is explicable, I think, if 
158 
159 
Ibid, p. 13. 
Ibid. 
the assumption of plurality is accompanied by the view of 
revisability. 11160 There are theorists who do criticize the 
liberal understanding of individual choice devoid of the 
concept of revisability161 • Among them are Taylor because 
it is logically empty and Sandel because it presupposes a 
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mistaken self-understanding. Kymlicka holds that this is a 
misreading of liberalism. 
[T]he concern is that this vaunting of 'free 
individuality' will result not in the confident 
affirmation and pursuit of worthy courses of 
action but rather in existential uncertainty and 
anomie, in doubt about the very value of one's 
life and its purposes. To put it 
melodramatically, the tragedy of the human 
situation is that we do indeed think of ourselves 
as morally sovereign--we alone can make these 
judgements of value, others can't make them for 
us. But at the same time, we can't believe in our 
judgements unless someone else confirms them for 
us. No one's life goes well if led according to 
values she's chosen but doesn't really believe in, 
and the confirmation of others is needed for firm 
belief. 162 
Another issue where Kymlicka highlights the arguments 
of critics of liberalism is in his discussion of the self 
and its interests. He identifies five communitarian 
arguments explaining the inadequacies of the liberal view of 
160 Ibid, p. 60. 
161 Kyrnlicka defines revisability as one of 
the basic "precondition for the fulfillment of our 
essential interests in leading a life that is 
good ... that we be free to question those beliefs, 
to examine them in light of whatever information 
and examples and arguments our culture can 
provide. " (Ibid. ) 
162 Ibid, p. 61. 
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the self: "(1) it is empty; (2) it violates our self-
perceptions; (3) ignores our embeddedness in communal 
practices; (4) ignores the necessity for social confirmation 
of our individual judgements; and (5) pretends to have an 
impossible universality or objectivity. "163 Communitarian 
criticisms of the liberal 'individualistic' pursuit of 
interests, according to Kymlicka, holds that "liberal 
politics is said to neglect the social preconditions for the 
effective fulfillment of those interests. "164 
While ultimately discounting the above communitarian 
objections, Kymlicka does recognize the importance of 
community in the development of the self and its interests. 
This recognition primarily takes the form of cultural 
membership. He maintains that cultural membership is a 
matter of circumstances, not shared choice (Waltzer's 
position), and that its subsequent standing as a legal issue 
is based on the liberal understanding of equality. 
"Cultural membership is not a means used in the pursuit of 
one's ends. It is rather the context within which we choose 
our ends, and come to see their value, and this is a 
precondition of self-respect, of the sense that one's ends 
are worth pursuing. And it affects our very sense of 
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about cultural membership to the liberal concept of 
equality, Kymlicka avoids many of the pitfalls found in 
understandings of community articulated by critics of 
liberalism. 
In his discussion of conceptions of the good and the 
choice process Kymlicka elaborates on the liberal definition 
of individualism. 
Liberal individualism is rather an insistence on 
respect for each individual's capacity to 
understand and evaluate her own actions, to make 
judgements about the value of the communal and 
cultural circumstances she finds herself in. 
Indeed, individuals have not only the capacity but 
also the responsibility for making such 
judgements; respect for the legitimate claims of 
others should enter into the very formation of our 
aims and ambitions. Liberal individualism is 
grounded in this irreducible commitment to the 
role of individual self-direction and 
responsibility in a just community, and to the 
principle of moral equality which underlies 
both . 166 
The above is Kymlicka's final verdict on the optimal 
circumstances for the pursuit of an individual's conception 
of the good, and how liberalism can best accommodate this 
understanding. 
Community and Cultural Membership 
Kymlicka's defense of liberalism relies heavily on his 
analysis of the respective theoretical weaknesses and 
strengths of two contemporary leaders in the field of 
liberal justice: John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Kymlicka 
166 Ibid, p. 254. 
identifies a number of features both utilized in their 
discussions of equality. "For both, the interests of each 
citizen are given equal consideration in two social 
institutions or procedures: an economic market and a 
political process of majority government. "167 He maintains 
that "their arguments notice, and indeed emphasize, our 
dependence, as individuals, on our cultural structure and 
community .... These liberals do not deny that the free 
individual is only possible in a culture of freedom. "168 
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Kymlicka notes that the centrality of notions such as 
neutrality and tolerance to liberal philosophy and society 
are proof they recognize the importance of community. "Many 
liberal philosophers have argued for tolerance because it 
provides the best conditions under which people can make 
informed and rational judgements about the value of 
different pursuits. Respect for the liberty of others is 
predicated not on our inability to criticize preferences, 
but precisely on the role of freedom in securing the 
conditions under which we can best make such 
judgements. 11169 However, many contemporary liberal 
theorists fail to make explicit conditions beyond economic 
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The liberal belief in the value of neutrality and 
pluralism was discussed in Chapter II of this thesis. While 
Kymlicka would agree that these tenets are essential to 
liberalism, he asserts that the strongest defense of 
pluralism is found when pluralism is accompanied by the 
revisability of individual ends . 170 This differs from the 
defense of pluralism found in the recent work of Rawls and 
Larmore, who base their defense of personal liberties on the 
plurality of different people's ends. Their theories 
maintain that "[s]o long as different people have differing 
ends, then mutual respect requires that the government ought 
not to favor one group over another." 171 
One aspect of community as the context of choice which 
Kymlicka explores is the distinction between political 
community and cultural community. Kymlicka notes that 
culturally plural states are the norm in the political 
communities of the globe172 • This situation presents an 
important theoretical challenge to the liberal polity. He 
faults leading liberal theorists such as Dworkin and Rawls 
for their silence on the issues of minority cultures in a 
world of cultural plurality within political communities. 
Kymlicka maintains that this theoretical lacuna leaves 
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conservative criticisms. 
Kymlicka views culture as arising from people's 
circumstances, not a matter of choice. He places his 
understanding of minority rights in the equality debate. 
Kymlicka holds that the only sound liberal response to the 
case of aboriginal rights is based upon an argument of 
unequal circumstances, not shared choice. In the Canadian 
context "unlike the dominant French or English cultures, the 
very existence of aboriginal cultural communities is 
vulnerable to the decisions of the non-aboriginal majority 
around them. They could be outbid or outvoted on resources 
crucial to the survival of their communities, a possibility 
that members of the majority cultures simply do not 
face." 173 English or French cultures in Canada "get for 
free what aboriginal people have to pay for: secure cultural 
membership. This is an important inequality, and if it is 
ignored, it becomes an important injustice. " 174 
Kymlicka's treatise examines issues of justice in 
liberal society and theory through the case study of 
aboriginal issues. This policy and theoretical dilemma is 
faced by many Western democratic liberal societies. 
Kymlicka contrasts and compares the differing challenges 
that Canada and the United States have faced with aboriginal 
legal issues over the years. He feels that the history of 
173 
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the civil rights movement and the situation of the black 
minority in America has radically affected the liberal 
debate on minority rights and the meaning of cultural 
membership. The attempt to interpret the constitution and 
legal system in a color blind manner to address the needs of 
the black American community has prejudiced interpreting the 
situation of Native American communities. While not 
advocating the reversal of civil rights legislation and its 
positive impact on the black American population, he holds 
that Native peoples' cultural membership requires a 
different interpretation of liberal understandings of 
culture and community. 
In fact, it is the situation of Indians, not 
blacks, in America which is most relevant for 
understanding questions of the protection of 
minorities. It is the special circumstances of 
American blacks that are anomalous in the 
international arena. Far more of the world's 
minorities are in a similar position to American 
Indians (i.e. as a stable and geographically 
distinct historical community with separate 
language and culture rendered a minority by 
conquest or immigration or the redrawing of 
political boundaries) . 175 
The arguments which Kymlicka develops within liberalism 
for the theoretical and policy challenges that minority 
rights present are persuasive. However, he is not a lone 
theorist in the liberal camp concerned with the 
communitarian attack of liberalism. Liberalism as the 
dominant contemporary theory has attracted many fine minds 
175 Ibid, p. 257-8. 
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to its defense. William Galston brings a different 
perspective to the project which bears highlighting. 
WILLIAM A. GALSTON 
While responding to both liberal and communitarian 
writers, William A. Galston's theoretical stance is firmly 
in the liberal camp. He acknowledges communitarian concerns 
about the condition of contemporary moral culture in liberal 
society, but maintains that liberalism is not wholly 
responsible for this situation. "Of all the issues facing 
contemporary liberal polity, one is of special concern to me 
here: the relationship between liberal political 
institutions and practices, on the one hand, and what might 
be called the moral culture of liberal society on the 
other. 11176 
Galston maintains that liberal theory has been unable 
to address many of the challenges facing the liberal polity 
in modern times, which has exacerbated communal problems 
rather than confronting them. His work aims to address 
problems in the political arena by making explicit a number 
of philosophical shortcomings of liberalism. However, 
176 William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: 
Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal 
State, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 6. 
Galston's theoretical perspective has been grounded in his 
activism in American political life. This experience 
contributed to his conclusion that not all problems in 
contemporary life can be blamed on theoretical weaknesses, 
nor do their solutions lie in the realm of theory alone. 
Pluralism and the Good 
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From its earliest days, the liberal conception of 
freedom, which focuses on the individual, has been accused 
of causing (or at least contributing to) grave damage to 
social unity. The classical liberal response to this 
argument, at least since Locke, is to counter that "civil 
strife is the product not of diversity but, rather, of 
public institutions designed to repress it. Acceptance of 
diversity will produce, or restore, peace; pluralism is 
compatible with social unity; self-determining individuals 
will be linked to the accommodating state by bonds of 
interest and conviction far stronger than a sullen obedience 
born of fear. "177 Galston asserts that contemporary 
liberals have taken this ideal of a tolerant state to an 
extreme, which has harmed the body politic. He holds that 
theorists such as Larmore and Rawls place state neutrality 
at the core of their liberal doctrines to the detriment of 
other liberal values. 
Galston believes that this preferential treatment of 
177 Ibid, p. 7. 
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neutrality has submerged other equally important liberal 
elements. At the heart of this version of liberalism is a 
conception of the good which belies its espoused neutrality. 
Liberalism presupposes a conception of individual human 
good178 which Galston believes should be explicit. Thus he 
begins his excavations of a set of human "conditions, 
capacities, or functionings, not just internal states of 
feeling. 11179 In brief summary he proposes the following 
account as the liberal theory of well-being: 
1. Life is basically good and the taking or premature 
cessation of life is bad. 180 
2. Normal humans are endowed with certain basic 
capacities: "the senses, various kinds of physical 
motion, speech, reason, and sociability, among 
others . "181 
3. Humans are "desiring, interest-pursuing, end-seeking, 
purposive creatures. 11182 
4. Freedom is an indispensable element of each 
individual' s good. 183 
178 Galston uses the term human good 
interchangeably with well being. (Ibid, p. 166.) 
179 Ibid, p. 170. 
180 Ibid, p. 174. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid, p. 175. 
183 Ibid. 
5. Elements of human rationality which are part of a 
liberal conception of the good include: 
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"(1} an understanding of means-ends relations 
sufficient to play an active, independent role in 
the economy and society; 
(2} each individual's understanding of himself or 
herself as similar to others for certain purposes, 
that is, as properly governed by general social 
rules; 
(3} the ability to respond to rational persuasion (as 
opposed simply to force and threats} ; and 
(4) when deliberating publicly in matters requiring 
collective action, the disposition to employ 
public reasons, open to inspection by others, 
whenever possible. 11184 
6. "An important element of our intrinsic good is the 
network of significant relations we establish with 
others. The ingredients are familiar: family, friends, 
social and work acquaintances, associates in voluntary 
organizations, fellow participants in intense 
collective endeavors such as politics and military 
combat, among others. "185 
7. "We regard an individual's subjective experience 
(pleasure versus pain, fear versus security, and so 
184 
185 
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forth) as an important element of his or her good .... 
Nor does it mean that we regard pleasure accompanying 
acts of harm done to others or oneself as good. 11186 
Galston holds that the above account of the good is 
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sufficiently thin, minimally perfectionist, and open enough, 
to accommodate a range of thicker conceptions of the good 
while still clarifying what is acceptable human behavior, or 
the basis of public action. In contrast to neutralist 
theorists of liberalism, Galston describes its distinctive 
qualities: 
It is not the absence of an account of the good 
that distinguishes liberalism from other forms of 
political theory and practice. It is rather a 
special set of reasons for restricting the 
movement from the good to public coercion. These 
reasons give liberals grounds for refraining from 
coercion altogether in some circumstances, for 
limiting coercion to the collective provision of 
capabilities or opportunities in others, and for 
substituting respectful persuasion for coercion 
wherever possible. In this, it is possible to 
bring our commonsense understanding of the 
individual good, and of the public role in 
promoting it, into harmony with the liberal 
commitment to diversity and resistance to 
tyranny. 187 
In the process of making explicit liberal purposes 
Galston maintains that the above account is an understanding 
of the good seen as opportunity rather than coercive 
command. "It will try to see to it that every adult has 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid, p. 180. 
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fair access to the good (or to the means to it), including 
the development of inner capacities needed to define and 
pursue a decent life, but will typically not try to enforce 
its conception on resisters. It will, however, try to 
impart its conception of the good to children and to protect 
them from violations of it. "188 
The State and Neutrality 
Galston's concern for the public policy implications of 
the above liberal account of human well-being is further 
developed in his understanding of the relationship between 
the individual and community. He writes that within the 
liberal polity distributive debates rely on three kinds of 
claims: "those arising from the bare fact of membership in 
the community (need) ; those arising from contributions to 
community (desert) ; and those arising from the voluntary 
individual disposition of resources in areas left 
undetermined by the legitimate claims of others 
(choice) . "189 
For purposes of this thesis the liberal conception of 
choice is of the most interest, and Galston holds that its 
theoretical foundation is based on the liberal conception of 
the good: "on individual freedom, on the satisfaction of 
legitimate interests, and on the broader view that this 
188 
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conception is partial and limited, and allows for a very 
significant range of legitimate diversity. 11190 This 
understanding of choice reveals Galston's commitment (albeit 
critical) to liberalism and community. "Liberalism is an 
account of the manner in which diverse moral communities can 
coexist within a single legal community" 191 Liberal 
reliance on procedural justice does not negate moral 
diversity, but rather prescinds it, anticipating that the 
inevitable conflict which arises within a pluralist society 
can be solved through just procedures in the broader 
political community. 
Galston asserts that the liberal presumption of state 
neutrality on moral matters, i.e. conceptions of the good, 
is not neutral in at least three senses: 
The first, just discussed, is the explicit 
preference given to civil considerations whenever 
religious practices come into conflict with them. 
The second is the implicit tilt toward religions 
characterized more by internal faith than by 
external observance - or, to put it the other way 
around, against religions in which piety is 
centrally expressed through obedience to a system 
of law, as in Orthodox Judaism and Islam. 
Finally, as suggested earlier, in our discussion 
of Rawls's "common-sense sociology," the Lockean 
distinction between faith and observance tends to 
screen out forms of religion whose viability 
depends on state mechanisms or endorsement. 192 
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sources and communitarian insights. The classical liberal 
account of toleration was based on the recognition that in 
political communities only some meanings are shared and 
others are not. Galston defines his rendition of liberal 
virtues understood instrumentally (for the preservation of 
liberal society and institutions) where the liberal polity 
is "possessing to a high degree the following features: 
popular-constitutional government; a diverse society with a 
wide range of individual opportunities and choices; a 
predominately market economy; and a substantial strongly 
protected sphere of privacy and individual rights. 11193 
At the center of Galston's liberal purposes is the 
belief in a core of virtues which liberals need to make 
explicit in order to respond to its critics. Without 
clarifying these virtues there are a number of dangers posed 
to the liberal polity: the tendency to overemphasize 
neutrality, which poses particular hazards; the inability to 
respond coherently to critics of liberalism, specifically 
those such as Macintyre who focus on the need for communal 
virtues; the liberal polity cannot begin to create, 
maintain, and educate citizens about the essential virtues 
necessary for the survival of its institutions, thus 
weakening the bonds of consensus necessary for its 
continuation. 
193 Ibid, p. 220. 
Liberal Virtues 
Galston is interested in stimulating a dialogue about 
the catalog of liberal virtues. He begins by maintaining 
that there are three virtues which are requisite of any 
political community: courage, law-abidingness, and 
loyalty . 194 Additionally, there are three virtues of 
liberal politics. 
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1. Virtues of citizenship: respect for the rights of 
others, the capacity to discern the talent and 
character of candidates and elected officials, and 
moderation and self-disciplined in demands, not simply 
self-interested in political outcomes. 
2. Virtues of leadership: patience and pragmatism to work 
within the constraints of social diversity and 
constitutional institutions, "capacity to forge a sense 
of common purposes against the centrifugal tendencies 
of an individualistic and fragmented society, " 195 and 
tempering the desire for reelection with responsible 
public policy. 
3. General political virtues: the commitment to open 
dialogue about divisive issues, resolving disputes 
through persuasion rather than manipulation or the use 
of force, and "the disposition to narrow the gap 
(insofar as it is in one's power) between principles 
194 
195 
Ibid, p. 221. 
Ibid, p. 226. 
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and practices in liberal society. "196 
Beyond these universal individual attributes liberal 
society has two salient features, individualism and 
diversity. These features are characterized by 
individualism balanced with the virtue of family solidarity 
and diversity maintained through the virtue of 
tolerance. 197 There are two types of virtues which Galston 
holds are essential to the liberal economy: 
those required by different economic roles and 
those required by liberal economic life as a 
whole. In a modern market economy, the basic 
roles are those of the entrepreneur and the 
organization employee. The entrepreneurial 
virtues form a familiar litany: imagination, 
initiative, drive, determination. The 
organizational virtues are very different from 
(and in some respects the reverse of) the 
entrepreneurial. They include traits such as 
punctuality, reliability, civility towards co-
workers, and a willingness to work within 
established frameworks and tasks. 198 
Galston lists three virtues of the general modern liberal 
economy: the work ethic, a capacity for moderate delay of 
gratification, and adaptability. 199 
The above index of instrumental liberal virtues Galston 
proposes as "empirical hypotheses about connections between 
individual character and social institutions. 1120° Combined 
196 Ibid, p. 227. 
197 Ibid, p. 222. 
198 Ibid, p. 223. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid, p. 227. 
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with his account of the liberal conception of the good, one 
has a broader perspective on how he understands liberal 
virtues which contribute to his underlying motivation of 
improving public policy in the liberal polity. 
CONCLUSION 
The work of Kymlicka and Galston borrows vocabulary 
from both liberals and communitarians, and shares their 
respective concerns for individualism and community. Both 
scholars have grounded their theoretical inquiries in real 
policy issues facing liberal polities and challenging 
communities. While neither claims to propose grand 
solutions to deep problems, both believe that liberal theory 
has to admit its theoretical shortcomings. Another common 
denominator in the work of these philosophers is that they 
agree that the eminence of individualism in liberalism has 
often ignored liberal presuppositions about healthy 
community and the meaning of cultural membership. 
The work of Kymlicka and Galston is much more closely 
grounded in the specific problems of liberal society and the 
public policy challenges than many in the contemporary 
liberal camp, as well as many critics of liberalism. 
Finally, both Kymlicka and Galston share an approach to 
community as a context of choice. Their theories recognize 
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cultural factors in the process of choosing conceptions of 
the good. Kymlicka does this explicitly and Galston 
implicitly. It is for that reason that I chose to focus on 
these two liberal thinkers, for they have elicited the 
needed vocabulary and articulated a framework within 
liberalism in order to build a more meaningful understanding 
of community. However, there are also a number of salient 
differences between Kymlicka and Galston. The final chapter 
of this thesis will attempt to explore more fully these 
differences, the effectiveness of their response to the 
communitarian critique and the success of their project to 
reinterpret liberal theory. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
"Socialization processes shape the members of the 
system into subjects capable of speaking and 
acting. The embryo enters this formative process, 
and the individual is not released from it until 




This thesis began by posing a number of questions about 
how leading liberal and non-liberal theorists conceptualize 
the relationship between the individual and his/her 
community. Subsequent chapters summarized and contrasted 
what various contemporary philosophers have written on the 
subject. Chapters two and three examined the works of 
notable theorists, from the liberal camp (John Rawls and 
Richard Flathman) and from the critics of liberalism 
(Alasdair Macintyre, Benjamin Barber, Charles Taylor, 
Michael Sandel and the authors of Habits of the Heart). 
Liberalism, as espoused by Rawls, Flathman and others, 
has a number of shortcomings with regard to the relationship 
between the individual and community. A number of these 
were identified by the critics of liberalism analyzed in 
201 Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 
trans. Thomas McCarthy (Beacon Press: Boston, 
1975) / p. 9. 
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chapter three. First, the deontological social contract 
rendition of liberalism was identified as problematic for 
placing the choice of principles of justice in a vacuum free 
of traditions, relationships, and circumstances. Second, 
concern about community and social, economic, environmental, 
political, and legal challenges facing American society is a 
common motive. Many critics feel that liberals have not 
dealt with the atomistic side of contemporary modern liberal 
societies. Third, these critical voices unite in 
identifying the inadequacy of the liberal portrait of the 
disengaged self. Whether it is Macintyre's narrative self, 
or Sandel's embedded self, they all plead to widen the 
liberal ontology (or to completely replace it), 
incorporating factors beyond the narrow confines of the 
atomistic disengaged self. 
Many of these critics are dissatisfied with liberal 
theory's understanding of the relationship between the 
individual and community and believe that this omission has 
harmed theory and, some even maintain, human collective 
identities. While many of the critical voices encountered 
in this thesis were eloquent and identified weak points in 
liberal theory, those same critics have failed to provide 
coherent alternatives to liberalism which outline 
theoretical guidelines for the application of principles of 
justice and protection of the rights of the individual. 
The fourth chapter examined the work of Will Kymlicka 
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and William Galston. These two theorist from within the 
liberal tradition have based their theoretical work on 
policy challenges facing contemporary liberal polities. 
Their voices combine the focus of communal needs and issues 
of identity with the theoretical strengths of liberalism. 
In Kymlicka's Liberalism, Community, and Culture he 
uses the challenge which minority rights have presented to 
liberal conceptions of justice to argue that liberal 
traditions can be drawn upon for a coherent recognition of 
culture as an essential right of the individual. Kymlicka 
bases his argument for expanding liberal understandings of 
minority rights on liberalism's commitment to equality of 
circumstances; viewing culture as a potential source of 
inequality which the dominant culture takes for granted, 
while minority cultures must struggle to maintain cultural 
integrity. Galston's Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and 
Diversity in the Liberal State focuses on "the relationship 
between liberal political institutions and practices, on the 
one hand, and what might be called the moral culture of 
liberal society on the other. 11202 Galston attempts to 
uncover a liberal conception of the good and begin a 
dialogue of liberal virtues for purposes of civic education. 
While Kymlicka and Galston both address recent 
criticisms of liberalism with regard to community and they 
share a number of theoretical commitments, there are also 
202 Galston, p. 6. 
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many differences in their work. This final chapter will 
note some of these differences and argue that Kymlicka's 
theoretical contributions best respond to the justified (in 
the opinion of this thesis) criticisms of liberal theory 
vis-a-vis issues of community. 
KYMLICKA AND GALSTON 
On the Ontological Level 
Both Kymlicka and Galston remain committed to the core 
ontological understandings of traditional liberal theory, as 
stated by Ackerman (page 4 of this thesis) . It holds that 
"human beings are purposive, goal-seeking creatures whose 
actions and patterns of action cannot be understood apart 
from their conceptions of the good." In harmony with 
communitarian insights, Kymlicka expands this basic 
definition to include cultural membership as an essential 
feature of human rationality. He points out that within the 
liberal moral ontology there has been no room for 
recognition of collective rights. This lacuna has had dire 
consequences for liberal moral and legal theory. 
Kymlicka's argument for the recognition of cultural 
membership as a legitimate claim to equal treatment is 
centered on his understanding that political communities in 
most modern manifestations contain diverse cultural 
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communities. This simple fact is often ignored in liberal 
theory and Kymlicka claims that this omission is why 
cultural membership is not recognized as a source of 
inequality. 203 Most liberals would justify this omission 
based on the following reason. 
Once individuals have been treated as equals, with 
the respect and concern owed them as moral beings, 
there is no further obligation to treat the 
communities to which they belong as equals. The 
community has no moral existence or claims of its 
own. It is not that community is unimportant to 
the liberal, but simply that it is important for 
what it contributes to the lives of individuals. 
Individuals and collective rights cannot compete 
for the same moral space, in liberal theory, since 
the value of the collective derives from its 
contribution to the value of individual lives. 204 
I believe that Kymlicka would include Galston in the 
same category with Rawls and Dworkin who he claims ignore 
the reality of minority cultures in contemporary liberal 
societies. These theorists do not deny the pluralist nature 
of contemporary society, but they state that the source of 
this diversity is not due to circumstances. Rather, it is 
the result of choice. Galston holds that modern liberal-
democratic societies are "characterized by an irreversible 
pluralism, that is, by conflicting and incommensurable 
conceptions of the human good. 11205 It is clear that the 
diversity which Galston is referring to is generated by 
203 Kymlicka, p. 178. 
204 Ibid, p. 141. 
205 Galston, p. 140. 
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differing conceptions of the good, not Kymlicka's cultural 
communities whose patterns of interaction and traditions 
provide the framework within which the individual navigates. 
Thus, it would appear that Galston's ontology excludes 
cultural factors as a source of diversity. Without this 
explicit recognition, I do not believe his ontology is 
expanded in the way that Kymlicka argues for. While 
Galston recognizes a type of liberal "culture" by 
articulating liberal values, he maintains that it is still 
part of the choice of a liberal conception of the good. 
Kymlicka is concerned with the inequality of circumstances 
of cultures, dominant (i.e. liberal) versus minority 
cultures. 
Galston envisions a diverse society, and the role of 
the state, where individuals begin with the same cultural 
frame of reference and freely chose their conceptions of the 
good. Conditions of self-respect rooted in culture are a 
constant in his understanding. This contrasts to Kymlicka's 
definition of the cultural pluralism found in most modern 
political communities and the unequal nature of their 
relationship. Galston's subsequent argument against the 
neutral state, as conceived by a number of contemporary 
theorists, is based upon his understanding of the meaning of 
pluralism. 
I find Kymlicka's understanding of pluralism of 
community far more convincing than conventional liberal 
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renditions of moral diversity. Kymlicka makes an important 
distinction between political and cultural communities, as 
respectively being the structures of a modern state, with a 
government and shared legal system206 and the cultural 
structure in a community as the context of choice for life-
plans allowing us to judge for ourselves the value of our 
choices207 • Kymlicka's definition of diverse cultural 
communities does not negate the value of Galston's 
observations on moral diversity. Rather it explores a 
further dimension of pluralism. 
Kymlicka's conception of plural cultural communities is 
a theoretical strength reinforced by an increasing 
understanding that the types of choices an individual within 
an indigenous community in Canada or the U.S. would make are 
not made in a cultural vacuum or behind a Rawlsian "veil of 
ignorance". Self-respect is an essential feature of the 
choice process of one's conception of the good208 • The 
cultural framework one inherits is interwoven with one's 
self-respect. Moreover, Kymlicka makes the argument, based 
on research among indigenous communities in North America, 
206 Kymlicka, p. 135. 
201 Particular cultural communities are not 
frozen in time, but continue "to exist even when 
its members are free to modify the character of 
the culture, should they find its traditional ways 
of life no longer worth while." (Ibid, p. 166-7.) 
208 Rawls terms self-respect the most 
important primary good. (Rawls, p. 440.) 
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that "cultural membership seems crucial to personal agency 
and development: when the individual is stripped of her 
cultural heritage, her development becomes stunted. 11209 
Kymlicka does not see one's cultural membership as a means 
used to pursue one's ends. "It is rather the context within 
which we choose our ends, and come to see their value, and 
that is a precondition of self-respect, of the sense that 
one' s ends are worth pursuing. "210 
Kymlicka has done a fine job of incorporating 
communitarian insights about the situatedness and 
embeddedness of the individual into liberal theory. By 
developing the idea of cultural membership and viewing 
community as a context of choice, I believe that Kymlicka 
has deeply affected the course of future liberal theory. At 
the ontological level, his expansion of the liberal view of 
what it is to be a human is first rate. 
Conflict 
In its history liberal theory has not shied away from 
issues of conflict. In fact it could be argued that 
liberalism's recognition of the inevitability of 
conflict211 has been a distinguishing feature. However, 
209 Kymlicka, p. 176. 
210 Ibid, p. 192. 
211 Ackerman's tenets of liberalism 4-6 
clarify the role of conflict. (See pages 4 and 5 
of this thesis.) 
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these discussions of conflict have demonstrated considerable 
diversity in how to minimize, or contain, the inevitable 
conflicts that arise. There are a number of types of 
conflict which liberalism is concerned with and which 
Galston and Kymlicka approach differently: conflict between 
moral or cultural communities within one political 
community, conflict between the state and sub-communities 
and conflict between the state and the individual. 
Kymlicka's work deals directly with the issue of 
conflict between minority and dominant cultural communities 
within the larger political community. His commitment to 
community as the context of choice holds that the state in 
refereeing such conflicts through the legal process must 
recognize the disadvantages which minority cultures function 
under as a source of inequality. Ultimately, Kymlicka holds 
that liberal accounts of justice must accord a role for 
cultural membership. 
This account of justice translated into policy in the 
liberal polity holds that cultural membership is essential 
for the principles of equality and tolerance. His argument 
hinges on the conception of human social needs which says 
that "it's only through having a rich and secure cultural 
structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of 
the options available to them, and intelligently examine 
their value. Without such a cultural structure, children 
and adolescents lack adequate role-models, which leads to 
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despondency and escapism. " 212 This position contrasts to 
Galston's which preferences the dominant liberal values when 
the state plays an arbitration role. 
In conflict which arises between the state and a 
minority community, Kymlicka would maintain that in the 
interest of justice the state needs to recognize the 
cultural integrity of that minority culture. If not 
expressly destructive to the larger political community, the 
minority community should be allowed to make its own 
decisions. Galston, however, sides in this conflict with 
the principle of the larger community. For example, if a 
minority community desires to withdraw in order to preserve 
their culture, his response is that "as long as your group 
remains located within the domain of wider community, it 
necessarily interacts with and affects that community in 
many ways .... It is not clear that the political community 
could afford to remain indifferent to the example you might 
set for other potential withdrawers. 11213 I believe that 
Kymlicka would respond to the specific instance of 
withdrawal or isolation of a particular cultural community 
based upon cultural circumstances. For instance, if a 
separatist supremist group sought withdrawal, I believe he 
would see that as a choice of a particular conception of the 
good. However, Kymlicka is concerned about the instance 
212 
213 
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where an indigenous culture's status as a minority did not 
occur by choice. In his expanded liberal project, he might 
recognize their claim for withdrawal, or at the least to 
have a type of insurance against intrusion by the dominant 
culture. 
At the level of conflict between the individual and the 
state, Galston and Kymlicka again diverge. The state has 
the authority to ensure that the core of liberal virtues 
which Galston outlines is guaranteed. "In cases of 
conflict, this civic core takes priority over individual or 
group commitments (even the demands of conscience), and the 
state may legitimately use coercive mechanisms to enforce 
this priority. 11214 
Galston maintains that without proper attention to 
liberal values, liberalism is headed for serious problems. 
He states at the beginning of his book: "My guiding 
intuition is that the United States is in trouble because it 
has failed to attend to the dependence of sound politics on 
sound culture, and that all similarly inattentive liberal 
polities will eventually experience similar 
difficulties. "215 This insight of Galston' s is reflective 
of his emphasis on political communities as the primary 
aggregate level, and his ignoring the diverse cultural 
communities within the liberal polity. This primarily 
214 
215 
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political perception of the collective level of human 
interaction does not address the communitarian critics of 
liberalism which understand human rationality and choice 




A salient strength of Kymlicka's work is that his 
protection of cultural communities is premised on the needs 
of the individual. His argument for considering cultural 
circumstances as a background feature of the choice process, 
as a context of choice, avoids many theoretical pitfalls 
which communitarians, and others critical of liberalism, are 
unable to avoid. Too often theorists in the communitarian 
camp want to give a particular version of community as the 
ultimate definition. Other theorists deconstruct 
liberalism, yet provide no meaningful conception of justice 
or society to replace it. For liberals, culture too often 
is but one choice that the individual will make in his/her 
life. I think that Kymlicka rectifies liberal sins of 
omission, while at the same time avoiding communitarian 
pitfalls. 
At the level of individual choice, I concur with an 
account of justice and knowledge such as Benjamin Barber 
presents which recognizes that uncertainty is part of the 
human experience. Barber writes that "where life means 
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constant motion and change is the only certainty" 216 • This 
leaves the individual choice process of meaningful life 
decisions plagued with doubt. However, many philosophers, 
from liberal to communitarian, place the choice process 
within a context of certainty. This certainty is arrived at 
variously, yet it accomplishes the same result: a 
circumstance where only one choice is plausible. 
Rawls's focus on justice as fairness contributes 
eloquently to the philosophical traditions of the social 
contract, procedural justice, and legal jurisprudence. 
However, his elaborate edifice of intersubjectivity is of 
little value in the contemplation of real choices, since he 
has guaranteed the selection of his principles of justice by 
the world he created in his 500 pages. It is surprising to 
think that the creatures in his theory would not chose his 
principles! Behind the veil of ignorance are human beings 
who contribute little to the discussion of human capacity of 
choice, and the context of choice, in the artificial 
original position, bears no relevance to my discussion of 
community as the context of choice. 
A critic of liberalism, Michael Walzer, paints a very 
compelling portrait of "real" community and how justice 
would work if we all inhabited the world found in his 
Spheres of Justice. He demonstrates a sincere concern for 
injustice, and one respects his aversion to coercion. "What 
216 Barber, p . 2 O . 
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is at stake is the ability of the group of people to 
dominate their fellows. It's not the fact that there are 
rich and poor that generates egalitarian politics but the 
fact that the rich 'grind the faces of the poor,' impose 
their poverty upon them, command their deferential 
behavior. 11211 While Walzer' s spheres of justice sound like 
a great place to live, he, like Rawls, places the choice 
process in a vacuum. 11 My purpose in this book is to 
describe a society where no social good serves or can serve 
as a means of domination. I won't try to describe how we 
might go about creating such a society. 11210 This statement 
hedges the issue of how moral, ethical and meaningful life 
decisions occur in our lives, and communities. 
CONCLUSION 
Kymlicka and Galston share features, but their 
renovation projects have very different objectives and 
starting points. While they both view community as a 
context of choice, Kymlicka's project attempts to rectify 
unequal/unjust legal treatment of minority rights. 
Galston's intent in articulating liberal virtues is to 
incorporate them into civic education. 
217 
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Both Kymlicka and Galston focus on practical policy 
challenges found in the contemporary liberal polity, as well 
as confront thorny theoretical issues. The public policy 
issue Kymlicka uses to illustrate and expand his theory is 
minority rights in North America. His theoretical challenge 
is to expand the liberal enterprise to justly address this 
policy dilemma. Galston's theoretical challenge is to 
articulate liberal virtues which recent versions of the 
neutral state are reluctant to make explicit. His policy 
concern is that civic education219 be instituted which 
reflect these clarified liberal virtues. 
Kymlicka states that he sees a political reason for 
expanding liberal theory to include a conception of cultural 
membership. "In a political or legal conflict between 
minority rights and liberal equality, liberalism may lose 
out. 11220 Galston believes that if civic education 
incorporated his liberal virtues, conflict would be 
minimized. By not socializing civic liberal values there 
are a number of dangers. The foremost threat "to children 
in modern liberal societies is not that they will believe in 
something too deeply, but that they will believe in nothing 
219 Galston defines the purpose of civic 
education to form citizens "who effectively 
conduct their lives within, and support, their 
political communities." (p. 243) 
220 Kymlicka, p. 154. 
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very deeply at all. 11221 
It appears to me that too much of Galston's theory 
requires recreating society. His project to articulate 
liberal purposes is not limited to the theoretical realm, in 
fact it requires that these liberal virtues then become part 
of the socialization process through a variety of mechanisms 
including the education system. Kymlicka's suggestions for 
expansion of the liberal enterprise is limited to the realm 
of legal jurisprudence which could easily accommodate his 
theoretical understandings. To reiterate this point, 
Galston's and Kymlicka's projects are very different in 
scope. Galston uses the pages of theory to describe how to 
change society, while Kymlicka hopes to impact his political 
community by expanding the role of culture in liberal legal 
theory. Galston's attempt to make explicit liberal virtues 
is convincing. However, I believe his idea on how to 
socialize such values is often weak and not spelled out 
clearly. 
I find Kymlicka's argument for using the case of 
minority rights to expand liberalism's boundaries persuasive 
- an important plank on which to construct a more stable 
liberal structure responsive to the challenges of the 
polity. I will repeat a quotation by Kymlicka used in the 
previous chapter to reiterate the value of culture and 
community as a context of choice. I think that because this 
221 Galston, p. 255. 
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recognition is absent in so much of contemporary philosophy 
- from Waltzer to Rawls - the health of liberal institutions 
of the modern state is affected. It is "[o]nly through 
having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can 
become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to 
them, and intelligently examine their value. Without such a 
cultural structure, children and adolescents lack adequate 
role-models, which leads to despondency and escapism. 11222 
In conclusion I would like to use the words of a 
prominent liberal theorist, Ronald Dworkin, who writes in 
his book A Matter of Principle that the role of theory is 
that of a critic, not a mirror: 
[i]t is part of our common political life, if 
anything is, that justice is our critic not our 
mirror, that any decision about the distribution 
of any good--wealth, welfare, honors, education, 
recognition, office--may be reopened, no matter 
how firm the traditions that are then challenged, 
that we may always ask of some settled 
institutional scheme whether it is fair. 223 
Reopening the debate on community within the liberal 
tradition is an opportunity to meet the challenge presented 
by social conditions, as well as that presented by critics 
of liberalism. I believe that by heeding Kymlicka's 
suggestion to expand liberal theory to encompass cultural 
membership, and viewing community as a context of choice, 
222 Kymlicka, p. 165. 
223 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), p. 219. 
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theory and the modern liberal polity we live in will be 
improved. I believe that despite theoretical shortcomings, 
the liberal enterprise is still alive and healthy. One of 
its strengths continues to be the quality of theorists, such 
as Kymlicka, who are attracted to its strengths, yet who 
ever seek to improve its insights. 
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